This book does not provide a historical account of what special forces accomplished in Vietnam. It is a collection of personal stories that convey howThis book does not provide a historical account of what special forces accomplished in Vietnam. It is a collection of personal stories that convey how the author acted in battle and while on leave, what he emotions he felt in battle, and his general impressions of the war. I don't know when he wrote this book in relation to when the events take place, so I did find myself wondering if his stories represented his views at that time or if they were representations of how his views changed once everything was settled. Overall, many of the stories were awe inspiring and somewhat horrifying - especially the details of the concussive blast of an Ark light strike....more
One question I asked myself repeatedly while reading this book was "Why did Robert Coram write this book?" He definitely did not write a hagiography oOne question I asked myself repeatedly while reading this book was "Why did Robert Coram write this book?" He definitely did not write a hagiography of Krulak - it seemed like Coram went out of his way to remind us of Krulak's defects at every chance.
I am left with the impression that he wrote about Krulak because of Krulak's patriotism and because Krulak changed the course of US history, in Coram's estimation.
I noticed similarities to his book on Boyd - namely, how hard it was for Krulak to get the US Navy to build a boat that worked and was cost efficient (the Higgins boat). I thought he might be writing the book as a continuation on the theme of how hard it was to fight military bureaucracy to accomplish something. Krulak, like Boyd, was also not acquiescent with his superiors when he felt they were making wrong decisions. They both sacrificed attaining the higher rank to stand up for their principles. Krulak never became Marine Corps Commandant because he told LBJ that he was screwing up the war in Vietnam. He had that conversation after witnessing planes full of marine casualties returning to the US.
Coram describes lots of other stuff about Krulak, but I am more interested in why he chose to write this book.
Merged review:
One question I asked myself repeatedly while reading this book was "Why did Robert Coram write this book?" He definitely did not write a hagiography of Krulak - it seemed like Coram went out of his way to remind us of Krulak's defects at every chance.
I am left with the impression that he wrote about Krulak because of Krulak's patriotism and because Krulak changed the course of US history, in Coram's estimation.
I noticed similarities to his book on Boyd - namely, how hard it was for Krulak to get the US Navy to build a boat that worked and was cost efficient (the Higgins boat). I thought he might be writing the book as a continuation on the theme of how hard it was to fight military bureaucracy to accomplish something. Krulak, like Boyd, was also not acquiescent with his superiors when he felt they were making wrong decisions. They both sacrificed attaining the higher rank to stand up for their principles. Krulak never became Marine Corps Commandant because he told LBJ that he was screwing up the war in Vietnam. He had that conversation after witnessing planes full of marine casualties returning to the US.
Coram describes lots of other stuff about Krulak, but I am more interested in why he chose to write this book....more
It took me a while to finish this book so not all of it is fresh in my mind. However, I think Fall wrote with wit, some humor, and well. His descriptiIt took me a while to finish this book so not all of it is fresh in my mind. However, I think Fall wrote with wit, some humor, and well. His description of men's recreational activities and attempts to nominate some ladies for medals were a contrast to much of the gloom of the rest of the account.
In general, he clearly outlines how revolutionary war is different from conventional war. In revolutionary war, the motivation was ideological, so another communist was always replaced to a killed one, whereas every killed French soldier was a reason for France to stop the war. It was also disappointing to read about the same basic tactic being used against the French over and over (and later against the Americans) - namely, letting the French and American hold territory where the North Vietnam could attack directly while French and Americans would require airlifting supplies in.
I think it doesn't get enough mention that North Vietnam won the war, the subsequent American Vietnam War by assassinating thousands of educated civilians in South Vietnam. They eliminated all the people who could keep the villages in the South together....more
I didn't love it. It is one of those books I wish I could like because the subject matter should be interesting to me. I took a few months to finish iI didn't love it. It is one of those books I wish I could like because the subject matter should be interesting to me. I took a few months to finish it because I hate not finishing books.
I think the main reason I struggled with it was because it came off as almost "cheerleading" the Marine Corps. I have immense respect for the Marines, but I like the appearance of objectivity in whatever I read. Further, the time period selected does not allow for as much detail as I am used to too regarding military history. ...more
This was hard to read immediately after finishing First Platoon: A Story of Modern War in the Age of Identity Dominance. I find Jacobson to be very prThis was hard to read immediately after finishing First Platoon: A Story of Modern War in the Age of Identity Dominance. I find Jacobson to be very pragmatic - as in, when the US invades another country, are the people who resist evil or patriotic? In American Sniper, Kyle always refers to his enemies as evil. I found this to be an interesting exploration of the mindset that allows soldiers to function. I have a feeling if Kyle had as many doubts as Jacobson, he would not have been effective as a sniper. It also delves into the relationship struggles military servicemembers face.
In addition, it is obvious that Kyle cared much about veterans. His death was during an attempt to help another veteran and is tragic....more
This book broadly address two issues: 1) the war crimes committed by Clint Lorance in Afghanistan and 2) the large scale collection of biometric data.This book broadly address two issues: 1) the war crimes committed by Clint Lorance in Afghanistan and 2) the large scale collection of biometric data.
Topic 1 - the war crimes of Clint Lorance. I learned that there is a non-profit organization called United American Patriots that defends American servicemembers they believe to have been unjustly convicted and wrongfully imprisoned on war crimes charges. Annie Jacobson appears to have found information that shows Lorance was pardoned based on false information regarding the identities of the men he had ordered attacked.
Regarding topic 2 - biometric data, I learned technology being developed that can collect finger prints from a distance. In general, the controversy over privacy is expanding beyond what people do on the Internet and is moving to air drones (that hover above cities taking videos) and the ability to collect biometric data without consent....more
This was a good (random) choice to read after finishing A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. Neil Sheehan details the Army's iThis was a good (random) choice to read after finishing A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. Neil Sheehan details the Army's inability to adjust their strategy in Vietnam or, really, confront what was actually happening in Vietnam. Nagl uses an MBA approach to analyzing influence within organizations to analyze failings of the US army in Vietnam compared to the British experience in Malaya (Britain initially struggled in Malaya before succeeding under new leadership). I think he may have an oversimplified approach because the British legitimately wanted to transfer control of the state to Malayans; whereas the US was supporting corrupt regimes and it may have been impossible to gain the same popular support that the British were able to do.
However, the overarching takeaway at the end is hard to argue with: Armies struggle with situations outside their core competency. Britain struggled more in the conventional wars of WWII than did the US, because the US was more focused on conventional wars. Similarly, Britain was more practiced in maintaining stability in far-flung regions with few troops and therefore had more success when dealing with small wars and counterinsurgency.
It was fascinating to gain a military strategy perspective on the Vietnam War soon after reading Sheehan's book....more
This was one of the best books I've read on World War I. After the first few chapters, I realized I've never read anything about WWI beyond what happeThis was one of the best books I've read on World War I. After the first few chapters, I realized I've never read anything about WWI beyond what happened in the first few months of the war. I read The Guns of August about the failed German offensive that started the war. I read A Mad Catastrophe: The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire which detailed the Hapsburg Empire and its disastrous early months of the war. I also read Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? which was a deep dive into what caused the war.
Meyer, in my opinion, was the most tolerant of Imperial Germany. At least, I've not read other authors who explained the German position as impartially as he did. Its the first time I had the impression that Kaiser Wilhelm was a puppet of the generals who held the most power. I was definitely not aware of Germany turning into a military dictatorship by the end of the war or the suffering (i.e., starvation) the German people endured. In general, my impression was that similar to other wars, the generals at the beginning are somewhat stupid and commit horrendous mistakes that lead to massive losses. As time goes by, these generals slowly lose sway and more able commanders finally take command. The British Generals, French and Haig, seemed especially slow to learn.
I liked the book's format and narrative. Some books are hard to read even when I like the subject material. This book was a pleasure....more
After reading Robert Coram's Brute: The Life of Victor Krulak, U.S. Marine, I wanted to learn more about the history of the Marines. The brief historyAfter reading Robert Coram's Brute: The Life of Victor Krulak, U.S. Marine, I wanted to learn more about the history of the Marines. The brief history Coram provided made the Marines sound nearly unbelievable. Coram pointed to 5 battles that signified the valor and tenacity of U.S. Marines: 1) the Battle of Belleau Wood (WWI) 2) the Battle at Gaudacanal (WWII) 3) the Retreat from the Chosin Reservoir (Korean War) 4) the Siege of Khe Sanh (Vietnam War) 5) the Second Battle of Fallujah (Iraqi War)
This book by Dick Camp blew me away. One commander started the day with 100o men and ended it with over 700 casualties. There were companies that were reduced to less than 10 men. The losses were staggering, but US Marines continued to assault and capture machine gun nests that were covered by other machine guns. And so, the Marines stopped the German Offensive that was 20 miles from Paris. ...more
I'm a fan of Pat O'Donnell without being a fan of his writing. This is the second of his books that I've read this week, and I found both to be less tI'm a fan of Pat O'Donnell without being a fan of his writing. This is the second of his books that I've read this week, and I found both to be less than I expected. I think O'Donnell thinks the facts can stand for themselves, and he doesn't need to draw the reader in with interesting writing.
My main complaints about this book are 1) a lack of explaining the greater context of the what/why, 2) lots of names and places without stories to make them more remarkable, and 3) upon finishing, I almost feel like I've forgotten it. I've read a couple books (Brute: The Life of Victor Krulak, U.S. Marine and This Kind of War: The Classic Military History of the Korean War) about the Korean War, and without them, I don't think I would have appreciated/understood this account. The Korean War, like all war, is tragic and horrific. In George Company, of the 17 men who started on the machine gun team at Inchon, only 3 remained after the exit from the Chosin Reservoir. And while the death toll was high for the Marines, Task Force Faith's convey retreating from the Chosin was utterly destroyed. O'Donnell addressed it indirectly, but he didn't dwell on how much better the Marines performed than the Army. The hardship they endured is hard to comprehend (one day reached -125 degrees -wind chill was 65mph).
Lots of great stories in here - especially of Rocco Zullo. I hope this isn't really an untold story and I can read more about it by another author....more
I'm always grateful for the authors who write about the lives, deaths and sacrifices our soldiers make. That holds true for this book, but I think it I'm always grateful for the authors who write about the lives, deaths and sacrifices our soldiers make. That holds true for this book, but I think it was too short. There wasn't enough detail. The introduction informs us the Lima Company is training to do house to house fighting - literally kicking down doors and sticking their heads into the awaiting guns. I honestly don't know how those Marines could stay sane preparing for that let alone actually doing it for 3 or 4 days in Fallujah. The company started with 42 men, and only 14 made it unharmed (non seriously wounded or killed) by the end of the battle. It was only after the 7th Marine died that the company commander gave them permission to start knocking down houses (explosives) rather than having Marines knock down doors.
This book and the last book I read about the Marines (Last Stand at Khe Sanh: The U.S. Marines' Finest Hour in Vietnam) both make the point the surviving Marines will not forget those that have fallen. I am thankful that Pat O'Donnell told these Marines story. I never knew what happened at Fallujah or what we asked the Marines to do there.
However, I wish there was more detail. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War was an engrossing read that I did not want to put down. This story was more violent, longer lasting, and required more fortitude (I think), but it was more like rolling facts than a great story. I think of Practicing History: Selected Essays where Tuchman says that writing nonfiction is an art. I've read less compelling stories by Tuchman that I found more engrossing than this book. ...more
This is a difficult book to read without more context of the Vietnam War. The author clearly states his narrow focus in the introduction. However, I rThis is a difficult book to read without more context of the Vietnam War. The author clearly states his narrow focus in the introduction. However, I read it without a lot of context, and it made the book harder to follow.
The book does an excellent job of explaining the hardships, death, injury, and misery of the Marines who endured the seige at Khe Sanh. Similar to The Outpost: An Untold Story of American Valor by Tapper, Jones does a good job of providing some background on as many Marines who died as possible. The difference, is quite different, in that Jones is able to follow the lives of the Marines much further into the future - including the accounts of Marines who later committed suicide. He interviewed a Marine who has struggled with why he survived when so many others died. The Marine realizes that he survived so that those who died would not be forgotten.
I read this book after reading Robert Coram's Brute: The Life of Victor Krulak, U.S. Marine. As part of Krulak's biography, he highlighted the major Marine actions that still define the service: 1) the battle of belleau wood, 2) the battle of Guadacanal, 3) the retreat from the Chosin Reservoir, 4) the seige at Khe Sanh, and 5) the second battle of Fallujah. I've subsequently read This Kind of War: The Classic Military History of the Korean War about the retreat from the Chosin Reservoir. The seige at Khe Sanh is similar in the horrible conditions, death and injury. The seige at Khe Sanh is completely different in that the Marines were told to just sit on a hill like sitting ducks. At least in the retreat, Marines were doing something - fighting their way out. At Khe Sanh, they were target practice for the NVA artillery....more
This is the third novel I've read about Operation Anaconda, the second that specifically focuses on the events at Takur Ghar. I think this book makes This is the third novel I've read about Operation Anaconda, the second that specifically focuses on the events at Takur Ghar. I think this book makes a lot more sense after reading Not A Good Day To Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda. These two books, published in 2005 and 2006, present the events at Takur Ghar in a more logical perspective - why senior commanders would pressure Mako 30 to infiltrate the mountain top at dawn. In Naylor's book, he gives depth to how bad the 10th mountain division was getting hammered in the valley and how air force combat controllers were saving the day with their coordination of close air support. Reading these two books together gives the impression that events at Takur Ghar were tragic, but necessary and important in the operation's circumstances.
Alone at Dawn: Medal of Honor Recipient John Chapman and the Untold Story of the World's Deadliest Special Operations Force by Schilling paints an entirely different picture. Schilling details how Pete Blaber infiltrated men into the Shahi-Kot Valley weeks in advance and prepared them with a thorough history of the valley. It was only after Blaber's teams were having so much success, that the Navy Seals wanted to insert their unprepared teams into the Shahi-Kot fighting. As MacPherson points out toward the end, the seals teams were in Afghanistan to hunt high value Al Qaida targets, not provide reconnaissance. Schilling's book, written almost 20 years later, makes the Mako 30 mission appear unnecessary because Blaber already had teams in place that were doing a good enough job. ...more
The biggest critique I have of this book is that it was written in 2010. I feel like he needs to add an authors note that states where to find an updaThe biggest critique I have of this book is that it was written in 2010. I feel like he needs to add an authors note that states where to find an update on the counterinsurgency circa 2020. Without really following this war closely, I have no idea if his recommendations were adopted, or, really, how the War is going (other than the fact that the US is still there and negotiating more with the Taliban).
He gives a brief history - high level - of other powers' (Macedonian, British, and Soviets) experience in Afghanistan. As I recall, he spends the most time highlighting the fractious nature of tribes within Afghanistan and the difference between operating a conventional war and a counterinsurgency.
I read Robert Koram's Brute: The Life of Victor Krulak, U.S. Marine and became interested in learning more about the epic Marine actions (Battle of BeI read Robert Koram's Brute: The Life of Victor Krulak, U.S. Marine and became interested in learning more about the epic Marine actions (Battle of Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, Battle of Chosin Reservoir, Khe Sang, and Fallujah) he cited throughout the book. I started with Fehrenbach's account of the Korean War, and it was a fantastic complement to Koram's work. Koram's book was basically about Marine culture and ethos "first to fight." Fehrenbach clearly lays out the difference between Army and Marine units - especially early in the war. I found this astonishingly good if not disheartening - I highlighted 235 passages.
He notes that the Korean War is known as the Forgotten War, and I understand why. I had no idea that 2 million people died and over forty thousand Americans. I learned about Truman, and a little about where/why the policy of containment came from. I was surprised by how much the events and lessons from the 50's "rhymed" with what is going on now.
Selected Quotes: "This was the kind of war that had bleached the bones of countless legionnaires on the marches of the empire, and had dug the graves of numberless Britons, wherever the sun shone."
"Each side had, perhaps, learned something: the Communists, that the will of free men is not easily broken, even when they are of peaceful intent; the West, that the Communist world holds human life cheaply, if there is aught to be gained."
Communism "More than anything else, the Korean War was not a test of power—because neither antagonist used full powers—but of wills. The war showed that the West had misjudged the ambition and intent of the Communist leadership, and clearly revealed that leadership’s intense hostility to the West; it also proved that Communism erred badly in assessing the response its aggression would call forth."
"The ghastly mistake made during the early hours of 27 June was that the personnel records of more than five thousand Korean employees of the embassy were left in their files. These files would fall into the hands of the Inmun Gun, and none of the employees who remained at their homes in Seoul would survive the Communist occupation."
"Among the thousands of Communist POW’s on Koje-do had been 474 North Korean female personnel, and the girls had been among the worst of the lot. At about the time Charles Schlichter and his comrades were coming home, these women were put on a South Korean train and sent north to Freedom Village for repatriation. On the way, they broke out Communist flags, and screamed and yelled at the gaping South Koreans alongside the tracks. As they neared Panmunjom, they began to tear off their capitalist-made and imperialist-issued clothing, to return home in Communist purity. Then they screamed and shrieked and ripped and tore up the train seats. They urinated on what they could not destroy"
"American soldiers were found who had been burned and castrated before they were shot; others had their tongues torn out. Some were bound with barbed wire, even around the head and mouth. They also found the bodies of four American GI’s, hands bound, shot, and bayoneted. And they found one officer, tied hand and foot, lying charred and blackened beside an empty five-gallon gasoline tin."
Americans "Because the American people have traditionally taken a warlike, but not military, attitude to battle, and because they have always coupled a certain belligerence—no American likes being pushed around—with a complete unwillingness to prepare for combat, the Korean War was difficult, perhaps the most difficult in their history."
"But the West did not prepare for trouble. It did not make ready, because its peoples, in their heart of hearts, did not want to be prepared. It would not have mattered if anyone had read the P’yongyang Manifesto."
"The United States could not be bought, or even intimidated, but it had a long history of looking the other way if not immediately threatened."
"A nation that does not prepare for all the forms of war should then renounce the use of war in national policy. A people that does not prepare to fight should then be morally prepared to surrender. To fail to prepare soldiers and citizens for limited, bloody ground action, and then to engage in it, is folly verging on the criminal."
Marines "It is admittedly terrible to force men to suffer during training, or even sometimes, through accident, to kill them. But there is no other way to prepare them for the immensely greater horror of combat. In 1950 the Marines, both active and reserve, were better prepared to die on the field of battle than the Army."
"But bitter or not, believing in the reasons for the war or not, the Marines went, and they obeyed orders."
"And they had discipline, which in essence is the ability not to question orders but to carry them out as intelligently as possible. Marine human material was not one whit better than that of the human society from which it came. But it had been hammered into form in a different forge, hardened with a different fire."
"Because their officers were tough-minded, because their discipline was tight, and because their esprit—that indefinable emotion of a fighting man for his standard, his regiment, and the men around him, was unbroken—weak and strong alike, they would face it well."
"Now Yancey could find only seven men in his platoon. Reeling from exhaustion and shock, he tried to form a countercharge. As he led the survivors against the broken line, a forty-five caliber Thompson machine-gun slug tore his mouth and lodged in the back of his skull. Metal sliced his right cheek, as a hand grenade knocked him down. On his hands and knees, he found he was blind. He heard Walt Phillips shouting, “Yancey! Yancey!” Somebody he never saw helped Yancey off the hill, led him back down the rear slope. He collapsed, and woke up later in the sick bay at Yudam-ni, where his sight returned"
"Behind him, on 1282, Captain Walt Phillips stood beside his standard until he died. Late in the afternoon, a new company relieved Easy; of its 180 men only twenty-three came off. But they held the hill."
"Reality had caught up with the Marines, as with all men, but they had faced it well. Everywhere, the Marines had held."
"It was not a motor march. It was a tactical battle most of the way, against Chinese who held the hills in depth. But the Marines came out, for three reasons:
One, Davis’ and Taplett’s men were able to climb the encircling mountains, knock the enemy off the ridges, drive them across the high timber. Moving by night, attacking cross-country in savage terrain and savage weather, these Marines took the Chinese in the flank, and by surprise. In the face of incredible hardship, the Marines were able to mount offensive action—and Barber’s Fox Company, 7th Marines, had been able to hold off two enemy regiments for six days, preventing the Chinese from closing their ring. If Barber had not held, the way would have been much more difficult.
Two, Marine air from the 1st Air Wing near Hamhung, carrier pilots from Philippine Sea and Leyte, and Air Force supply planes flew constantly over the column. Marine aircraft strafed, bombed, and napalmed as close as fifty yards from the leading elements.
Third, General Sung Shih-lun had gambled. In the horrendous terrain, he had never been able to bring his full manpower to bear on the embattled Marines, outnumbered though they were."
Truman "But as President Truman stated later, the United States Government saw absolutely no chance of forcing its will—as it had on Germany and Japan—upon the vast land masses of Russia and China, even by means of general war. They felt that such a war against these powers would solve nothing for the United States, and should as far as humanly possible be avoided. If the Communist powers held back from total war, the United States would follow suit."
ROK Army "They died chopped down by the tank machine guns, or shot by the supporting NKPA infantry. They died shrieking under the tank treads. When almost a hundred had been killed in this manner, the desire to fight tanks barehanded began to leave the survivors."
"There was nothing wrong with either the stamina or courage of the ROK soldier. Too many thousands of them died above Seoul proving otherwise."
Description of arsenals (glossary at the end) "Firing as many as 100,000 rounds per day, the Quad .50 could go over hills like a vacuum cleaner, sucking them devoid of life."
"in the first six weeks, American losses amounted to 6,000 men; the ROK’s lost 70,000 killed, wounded, or missing."...more
I think this book goes well after reading The Outpost: An Untold Story of American Valor by Jake Tapper. Tapper gives a complete history of the OutposI think this book goes well after reading The Outpost: An Untold Story of American Valor by Jake Tapper. Tapper gives a complete history of the Outpost and recognizes all the men who died during the three years COP Keating was operational. Romesha focuses on the final battle at Keating - giving much more detail on what the individual soldiers were experiencing. He begins with some of his own history in Iraq, moves through Red Platoon's formation and training in Colorado, and is almost entirely about the battle. Tapper's book is much more philosophical. Romesha is much more about the battle with some reflection at the end.
Some quotes I highlighted: - "Sometimes it’s the case that the mission’s best interest aligns with that of the men. Sometimes it isn’t. Regardless, an officer’s primary concern starts and ends with the mission. So while it’s important to listen to your men, you’re not there to make friends, because you don’t always have their best interests front of mind."
-"Unlike Gregory, Jones understood that it wasn’t acceptable to simply keep their heads down and cower at the bottom of the trench in the hope that things would somehow improve."
-"WHEN I LOOK back on this part of our story now, I’m struck by two things, the first of which is the harshness of some of the choices that confronted us, along with the speed and the cold sense of detachment with which we made them."
-"The only nuance to this strategy was to make sure that Raz would be the first person through the door. The reason I wanted him on point—and he knew it—was that if we were hit by a stream of fire, his massive frame would serve as a shield and hopefully enable the men behind him to stay alive long enough to complete this phase of the assault."
-"In further confirmation of the fact that Dannelley was not our platoon’s number one draft pick, he’d discarded his first-aid kit to make room for snacks to munch on when he was on guard duty." ...more
I hate to give any book that seeks to honor the men who serve in our armed forces less than 4 or 5 stars, but overall, I didn't like Tapper's writing I hate to give any book that seeks to honor the men who serve in our armed forces less than 4 or 5 stars, but overall, I didn't like Tapper's writing style. I found it disjointed and I don't think it flowed well. That said, he took on a monumental task in trying to cover over 3 years of activity while also humanizing every soldier who died at COP Keating. It got to the point where I hated to see him start describing a soldier's personal life in great detail because it generally meant the soldier was going to die in an upcoming skirmish or battle.
I've never served in the military, so I can't possibly relate to what the men in this book went through. These, among many, are a couple quotes I found impactful: -"Dave Roller was distraught at the loss of Bostick; everyone in Bulldog Troop was. But for Roller, the hardest thing of all was his belief that even as he and his fellow soldiers were out there fighting for their lives, no one back home cared. Ninety percent of the American people would rather hear about what Paris Hilton did on a Saturday night than be bothered by reports on that silly war in Afghanistan, Roller thought. Of this he was convinced. That the people they’d been fighting for would never even know their names made the death of soldiers such as Tom Bostick and Ryan Fritsche all the more tragic"
-"Indeed, it was always the same thing with Scusa: Connor did this, Connor did that, Connor is walking, Connor is eating solid food. He was a very proud father, as well as a hardworking soldier. And now he would never see his boy again. Birchfield started crying."
I want to mention the charities that Tapper mentioned at the end of the book: Army Emergency Relief 200 Stovall Street Alexandria, VA 22332 www.aerhq.org Defenders of Freedom 706 Stratford Lane Coppell, TX 75019 www.defendersoffreedom.us Fisher House Foundation, Inc. 111 Rockville Pike, Suite 420 Rockville, Maryland 20850 www.fisherhouse.org Snowball Express 1333 Corporate Dr., Suite 105 Irving, TX 75038 www.snowballexpress.org Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors, Inc. 1777 F Street NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20006 www.taps.org Wounded Warrior Project 899 Belfort Road, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32256 www.woundedwarriorproject.org ...more
Mostly, I thought this was a very hard book to read. I could understand it all, but I often had to read passages 2 or 3 times to figure out what the aMostly, I thought this was a very hard book to read. I could understand it all, but I often had to read passages 2 or 3 times to figure out what the author meant. That's unfortunate because I think Col Beckwith was a great man and had lots of wisdom in his memoir. The book is his memoir and covers his time in the Army with emphasis on this time in Vietnam, forming Delta Force, and the failed mission to rescue the Iranian Hostages in 1980.
He wrote about a time when he was surrounded by NVA regulars after being sent to reinforce a camp at Plei Me. After the battle was over, while walking around, he discovered two NVA soldiers chained to their machine guns to prevent them from fleeing.
He wrote about being scared/fear. "...he wasn't ashamed to talk about being scared. We talked for hours. Everyone was scared. Any man who wasn't had to be plumb crazy. If you don't respect fear then there's no way you can handle it. Fear can be damn dangerous, but if you can come to grips with it, wrestle it, understand it, then you've got a chance to work around it." He didn't have much patience for men who couldn't work around it.
He also wrote about the selection process for Delta. It was partially about the physical ability, but it was more about the quality of being able to dig deep and not quit. The physical testing was designed to completely deplete men of their energy reserves. However, in order to finish the course in time, the men would have to have the mental fortitude to keep going when they shouldn't be able to - or when most would quit.
I read about the Air Force Combat Controllers, and the physical testing was similar. CCs would swim underwater until their oxygen was depleted. Then the real testing would begin to see which CCs could continue to swim laps underwater....more
I finished "Alone at Dawn" a few weeks ago and read this to find out more about the operation where John Chapman died. The book is fairly exhaustive, I finished "Alone at Dawn" a few weeks ago and read this to find out more about the operation where John Chapman died. The book is fairly exhaustive, I think, with respect to the planning the lead up to the operation and what happened in the first few days. Unfortunately, I thought the writing was horrible - sentences were repeatedly 40 words or more and lots of passive voice (e.g., "Training their polyglot Afghan force in basic infantry tactics was no small task for, oddly enough, given the mission the Americans would ask them to perform a few weeks later, one field in which Zia and his small band of peasant warriors—only half the size of a U.S. infantry company when he joined forces with Texas 14—had almost no experience was combat."). I had to read sentences two or three times and sometimes still couldn't figure out what phrases were describing what.
Some of my thoughts - Leadership, DefSec Rumsfield, did not want conventional troops in Afghanistan to avoid the drawn out operations American forces were doing in Bosnia. - Before Anaconda, relying on Afghan militias, resulted in many Al Qaida troops escaping into Pakistan during the battle of Tora Bora. The same thing happened again at Shahikot. - Naylor makes it sound like the military has hidden special forces that the public knows nothing about - not even the names. - A multitude of reasons that Anaconda went horrible: no unity of command (each component, such as special forces, rangers, air force support, reported to their own leadership), breaking up units that trained together, not allowing infantry to bring their artillery support, none changing the plan when new intelligence revealed the original plan wouldn't work, and taking command away from the most qualified person to have it (Blaber) - Amercian Special Forces are freaking amazing - well some of them. Some did their jobs and others were portrayed as whiners
Quotes I highlighted: - "a lone AK-47-wielding guerrilla firing a bullet that cost pennies had come within millimeters of downing a multimillion-dollar Black Hawk helicopter and consigning the brigade commander, his air mission commander, operations officer, and air liaison officer, as well as an RTO and the air crew, to their doom." - "By seizing the low ground, TF Rakkasan had put itself on terrain from which it was hard to identify the enemy positions from which it was receiving fire." - "As ever in combat, it was left to captains and sergeants to bear the consequences of mistakes made by generals." - "To the AFO personnel in Gardez and in the valley, Trebon’s move to have TF Blue take over the operation was ill-considered and appeared to be motivated by professional jealousy." - "The selection of Hyder to command and control the SEAL elements in Gardez was a strange decision on the part of Captain Joe Kernan, the Task Force Blue commander." - "(Despite repeated requests, Trebon, Kernan, and Hyder were not made available for interview for this book by U.S. Special Operations Command.)" - "It is a reconnaissance axiom that a recce team should never infiltrate by helicopter directly onto its observation post, because doing so essentially signals the team’s location to the enemy." - "Yet again in Anaconda, senior leaders’ failure to establish a tight, unified chain of command was adding unnecessary friction to that which is inevitable in any combat operation." - "Suddenly another voice came on the radio, that of Brigadier General Gregory Trebon, the TF 11 commander, who was a few hundred meters away in the TF Blue TOC. “We don’t need you getting all worked up on the radio,” the Air Force officer told Jimmy condescendingly." - "Trebon was making a decision he would come to regret." - “They had a lot of heat, a lot of general officers and colonels pumping them for information and offering advice, and they had the least SA [situational awareness] down there in their cave,” - Again, the decision to take Blaber out of the command chain was revealed to be a terrible mistake. - “Whatever you do, don’t send them back to this same LZ,” he told Naler. “It is absolutely hot.” It was a message that was sent from Masirah, but never received. - This wasn’t just the view of those on Takur Ghar. Juliet Team, who watched and listened to the entire battle, also reported up the TF 11 chain of command that the LZ was secure and the casualties could be medevaced. But it was not to be. At least, not until it was too late for one more brave airman.
I listened to this as an audiobook and did not want to stop listening. I have the utmost respect for John Chapman and the other Combat Controllers andI listened to this as an audiobook and did not want to stop listening. I have the utmost respect for John Chapman and the other Combat Controllers and other Special Operations Forces teams members mentioned in this book.
This book tells the history of Combat Controllers (1st half of book) and then the actions of Combat Controllers in the first months of the US military action in Afghanistan. It culminates with the story of John's death, Seal's teams inserting onto the summit of Takur Ghar and the subsequent rescue operation. I've never served, so I don't understand battle plans, but it seems like this incident was a tragic mistake. The US sought battle in Shahi-Kot Valley (Operation Anaconda) because there was a large force of al-Qaeda. From the book, it seems like LTC Blaber was in charge of the AOF, and did not want the Seal Teams inserted to their positions. However, CDR Timothy Szymanski said the teams really needed to get inserted late in the night (too close to dawn) when the operation was running late because of helicopter malfunctions. The leader of Chapman's and Roberts Seal Team even requested to delay insertion until the next night. The author makes it sounds like from LTC Blaber's perspective, the insertion was not necessary because the AOF Combat Controllers in place were providing the needed air support.
Regardless of why CDR Szymanksi ordered the seal teams to insert, it was a horrible decision that lead to the deaths of Chapman and Roberts and later 5 members of the Quick Reaction Force that came to the rescue of the Seal Team. When Chapman's helicopter crashed, he charged uphill to a protected machine gun bunker and killed the enemy soldiers who were firing on the uncovered Seal Team. He was wounded and left behind because the Team thought he was already dead. When the QRF team arrived to rescue the Seal Team, Chapman left his covered position in the bunker to provide cover for the helicopter's approach.
It is an amazing account of valor, courage and brotherhood. The conclusion, with impact on John's family and parents is heartbreaking....more
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