Evan's Reviews > Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

This was a good (random) choice to read after finishing A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. Neil Sheehan details the Army's inability to adjust their strategy in Vietnam or, really, confront what was actually happening in Vietnam. Nagl uses an MBA approach to analyzing influence within organizations to analyze failings of the US army in Vietnam compared to the British experience in Malaya (Britain initially struggled in Malaya before succeeding under new leadership). I think he may have an oversimplified approach because the British legitimately wanted to transfer control of the state to Malayans; whereas the US was supporting corrupt regimes and it may have been impossible to gain the same popular support that the British were able to do.

However, the overarching takeaway at the end is hard to argue with: Armies struggle with situations outside their core competency. Britain struggled more in the conventional wars of WWII than did the US, because the US was more focused on conventional wars. Similarly, Britain was more practiced in maintaining stability in far-flung regions with few troops and therefore had more success when dealing with small wars and counterinsurgency.

It was fascinating to gain a military strategy perspective on the Vietnam War soon after reading Sheehan's book.