NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies. (English) Zbl 1426.91024
Summary: Inspired by H. E. Scarf [“On the existence of a cooperative solution for a general class of \(N\)-person games”, J. Econ. Theory 3, No. 2, 169–181 (1971; doi:10.1016/0022-0531(71)90014-7)], J. Zhao [Int. J. Game Theory 28, No. 1, 25–34 (1999; Zbl 1003.91003)], W. H. Sandholm [Population games and evolutionary dynamics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2010; Zbl 1208.91003)] and our work [Optim. Lett. 13, No. 7, 1573–1582 (2019; Zbl 1432.91016)],
we introduce the model of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies, and define the notions of NTU core and TU core for coalitional population games. We next prove the existence results for NTU cores and TU cores. Furthermore, as an extension of the NTU core, we introduce the notion of strong equilibria and prove the existence theorem of strong equilibria.
MSC:
| 91A12 | Cooperative games |
References:
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