Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games. (English) Zbl 1395.91060
Summary: We study games endowed with a pre-play phase in which players prepare the actions that will be implemented at a predetermined deadline. In the preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to revise her actions, and the finally revised action is taken at the deadline. In two-player “common interest” games, where there exists a best action profile for all players, this best action profile is the only equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. In “opposing interest” games, which are \(2 \times 2\) games with Pareto-unranked strict Nash equilibria, the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game is generically unique and corresponds to one of the stage-game strict Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails depends on the payoff structure and on the relative frequency of the arrivals of revision opportunities for each of the players.
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