Coordination need not be a problem. (English) Zbl 1280.91008
Summary: In a game of common interest there is one action vector that all players prefer to every other. Yet there may be multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria in the game and the “coordination problem” refers to the fact that rational equilibrium play cannot rule out Pareto-dominated equilibria. In this paper, I prove that two elements – asynchronicity and a finite horizon – are sufficient to uniquely select the Pareto-dominant action vector (in subgame perfect equilibrium play). Asynchronicity may be exogenously specified by the rules of the game. Alternatively, in a game where players choose when to move, asynchronicity may emerge as an equilibrium move outcome.
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