×

The sample complexity of auctions with side information. (English) Zbl 1375.91092

Wichs, Daniel (ed.) et al., Proceedings of the 48th annual ACM SIGACT symposium on theory of computing, STOC ’16, Cambridge, MA, USA, June 19–21, 2016. New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) (ISBN 978-1-4503-4132-5). 426-439 (2016).

MSC:

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
62C10 Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures
68Q25 Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity

References:

[1] P. Azar, C. Daskalakis, S. Micali, and S. M. Weinberg. Optimal and efficient parametric auctions. In Proc. of ACM-SIAM SODA, pages 596-604, 2013. · Zbl 1422.91289
[2] M.-F. Balcan, A. Blum, J. D. Hartline, and Y. Mansour. Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 74(8):1245-1270, 2008. 10.1016/j.jcss.2007.08.002 · Zbl 1157.68055
[3] S. Bhattacharya, E. Koutsoupias, J. Kulkarni, S. Leonardi, T. Roughgarden, and X. Xu. Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders. In Proc. of ACM EC, pages 91-102, 2013. 10.1145/2482540.2482555
[4] J. Bulow and P. Klemperer. Auction versus negotiations. American Economic Review, 1996.
[5] R. Cole and T. Roughgarden. The sample complexity of revenue maximization. In Proc. of ACM STOC, pages 243-252, 2014. 10.1145/2591796.2591867 · Zbl 1315.91026
[6] N. R. Devanur, Z. Huang, and C.-A. Psomas. The Sample Complexity of Auctions with Side Information. ArXiv e-prints, Nov. 2015.
[7] P. Dhangwatnotai, T. Roughgarden, and Q. Yan. Revenue maximization with a single sample. Games and Economic Behavior, 2014.
[8] S. Dughmi, L. Han, and N. Nisan. Sampling and representation complexity of revenue maximization. In Web and Internet Economics, pages 277-291. Springer, 2014. · Zbl 1406.91171
[9] E. Elkind. Designing and learning optimal finite support auctions. In Proc. of ACM-SIAM SODA, pages 736-745, 2007. · Zbl 1303.91083
[10] E. Even-Dar, J. Feldman, Y. Mansour, and S. Muthukrishnan. Position auctions with bidder-specific minimum prices. In Internet and Network Economics, pages 577-584. Springer, 2008. 10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_64
[11] J. D. Hartline and T. Roughgarden. Simple versus optimal mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 225-234. ACM, 2009. 10.1145/1566374.1566407
[12] Z. Huang, Y. Mansour, and T. Roughgarden. Making the most of your samples. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ’15, Portland, OR, USA, June 15-19, 2015, pages 45-60, 2015. 10.1145/2764468.2764475
[13] S. Lahaie and D. M. Pennock. Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 50-56. ACM, 2007. 10.1145/1250910.1250918
[14] S. Leonardi and T. Roughgarden. Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders. In Proceedings of the Forty-fourth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’12, pages 427-434, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM. 10.1145/2213977.2214018 · Zbl 1286.91057
[15] J. Morgenstern and T. Roughgarden. The pseudo-dimension of nearly-optimal auctions. In NIPS, page Forthcoming, 12 2015.
[16] R. B. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1):58-73, 1981. 10.1287/moor.6.1.58 · Zbl 0496.90099
[17] M. Ostrovsky and M. Schwarz. Reserve prices in internet advertising auctions: A field experiment. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 59-60. ACM, 2011. 10.1145/1993574.1993585
[18] B. Roberts, D. Gunawardena, I. A. Kash, and P. Key. Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions. In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 751-766. ACM, 2013. 10.1145/2482540.2482568
[19] M. Sion et al. On general minimax theorems. Pacific J. Math, 8(1):171-176, 1958. · Zbl 0081.11502
[20] B. Sivan and V. Syrgkanis. Vickrey auctions for irregular distributions. In Web and Internet Economics, pages 422-435. Springer, 2013. 10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_35 · Zbl 1406.91191
[21] D. R. Thompson and K. Leyton-Brown. Revenue optimization in the generalized second-price auction. In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 837-852. ACM, 2013. 10.1145/2482540.2482612
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.