The sample complexity of revenue maximization. (English) Zbl 1315.91026
Proceedings of the 46th annual ACM symposium on theory of computing, STOC ’14, New York, NY, USA, May 31 – June 3, 2014. New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) (ISBN 978-1-4503-2710-7). 243-252 (2014).
MSC:
| 91B26 | Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models |
| 68Q17 | Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) |
| 68W25 | Approximation algorithms |
Software:
SuLQReferences:
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