Polytopes of special classes of the balanced transferable utility games. (Russian, English) Zbl 1349.91029
Diskretn. Anal. Issled. Oper. 23, No. 1, 97-112 (2016); translation in J. Appl. Ind. Math. 10, No. 1, 145-154 (2016).
Summary: Under study are the polytopes of \((0, 1)\)-normalized convex and 1-convex (dual simplex) \(n\)-person TU-games and monotonic big boss games. We solve the characterization problems of the extreme points of the polytopes of 1-convex games, symmetric convex games, and big boss games symmetric with respect to the coalition of powerless agents. For the remaining polytopes, some subsets of extreme points are described.
MSC:
| 91A12 | Cooperative games |
| 52B12 | Special polytopes (linear programming, centrally symmetric, etc.) |
| 91A06 | \(n\)-person games, \(n>2\) |
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