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Compromise values in cooperative game theory. (English) Zbl 0820.90140

Summary: Our aim is to give a survey on several well-known compromise values in cooperative game theory and its applications. Special attention is paid to the \(\tau\)-value for TU-games, the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for bargaining problems, and the compromise value for NTU-games.

MSC:

91A12 Cooperative games
Full Text: DOI

References:

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