The compromise value is introduced as a single-valued solution concept for NTU-games. It is shown that the compromise value coincides with the \(\tau\)-value for TU-games and with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for bargaining problems. In addition, the axiomatic characterizations of both the two-person Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the \(\tau\)-value can be extended to the compromise value for large classes of NTU-games.
We also present an alternative NTU-extension of the TU \(\tau\)-value (called the NTU \(\tau\)-value) which coincides with the Nash solution for two-person bargaining problems. The definition of the NTU \(\tau\)-value is analogous to that of the Shapley NTU-value.
Both the compromise value and the NTU \(\tau\)-value are illustrated by means of the Roth-Shafer examples.