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Shenoy, P. P.

On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach. (English) Zbl 0418.90096

Int. J. Game Theory 8, 133-164 (1979).
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Cited in 1 Review
Cited in 57 Documents

MSC:

91A12 Cooperative games

Keywords:

coalition formation: n-person cooperative games; abstract game models; core; dynamic solution; side payments; individually rational payoffs; Shapley value; bargaining set
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References:

[1] Anderson, S.L., andE.A. Traynor: An application of the Aumann-Maschlern-person cooperative game. Recent Advances in Game Theory. Ed. by M. Maschler. Princeton 1962, 265–270.
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[3] Aumann, R.J., andM. Maschler: The bargaining set for cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics Study52, 1964, 443–476. · Zbl 0132.14003
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[12] Lucas, W.F.: A game with no solution. Bull. Amer. Math. Soc.74, 1968, 237–239. · Zbl 0157.51101 · doi:10.1090/S0002-9904-1968-11901-9
[13] –: A proof that a game may not have a solution. Trans Amer. Math. Soc.137, 1969, 219–229. · Zbl 0184.23602 · doi:10.1090/S0002-9947-1969-0237183-X
[14] Lucas, W.F., andJ.C. Maceli: Discrete partition function games. Game Theory and Political Science. Ed. by P. Ordeshook. New York 1978, 191–213.
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[17] Shapley, L.S.: A value for n-person games. Annals of Mathematics Study28, 1953, 307–317. · Zbl 0050.14404
[18] –: Simple games: An outline of the descriptive theory. Behavioral Science7, 1962, 59–66. · doi:10.1002/bs.3830070104
[19] –: On balanced sets and cores. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly14, 1967, 453–460. · doi:10.1002/nav.3800140404
[20] Shapley, L.S., andM. Shubik: A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system. Amer. Political Science Review48, 1954, 787–792. · doi:10.2307/1951053
[21] Shenoy, P.P.: A dynamic solution concept for abstract games. Mathematics Research Center, Technical Summary Report No. 1804, University of Wisconsin, Madison 1977a. · Zbl 0416.90088
[22] -: On game theory and coalition formation. School of Operations Research and Industrial Engineering, Cornell University, Technical Report No. 342, New York, 1977b.
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