Miroslaw Aleksander's Reviews > Liquid Modernity
Liquid Modernity
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Before Liquid Modernity I’ve read several shorter works by Bauman. I didn’t find them groundbreaking, but they had their strong points. I was anticipating something more from this book, which is considered as one of his more important works.
Liquid Modernity proved to be a frustrating and disappointing read, flawed in many ways. Bauman’s knowledge is based on newspaper articles, casual observations and interpretations found in books written by others. He is selective with his material, and manipulates historical facts to suit his view. He is also fond of using absolute quantifiers, or implying that certain issues are universal. Even when he recognizes that something is not universal, he spins it in a way that would prove his point, as in his observation of the two young men sitting at an airport when he admits that such situations are not common, but immediately adds that this is what people (not some people, not a given group of people, but ‘people’) aspire to, and, as such, it is what will happen.
Bauman’s idea is that liquid modernity, which characterizes the era of ‘light capitalism’ (easily moved from country to country, flexible labor, etc.) is the end of true freedom (this is another problem, as Bauman sees individual freedom as a tool of oppression), ensnares people in the endless search for novelty, and destroys past values. People no longer want to interact. They run around shopping malls, in which there is no interaction, no community, just atomized individuals, who are focused on themselves – it is hard not to read Bauman’s lament as putting ‘society’ and ‘individual’ as a binary opposition. Ha also blames this on the concept of identity – “what matters is who you are, rather than what you are doing” (p. 108). No longer is social change possible, he suggests. There is no authority (or, rather, there are too many authorities, which cancel each other out – an issue that one can agree on), so even if people wanted to change something, they have nothing to protest against. So they go shopping. Bauman doesn’t mention why, in that case, are right-wing politics on the rise, nor why so much political strife can be observed.
The assumption Bauman makes, such as that uncertainty is a principle of liquid modernity and not found in previous epochs. Although he is accurate in his statement that Henry Ford’s increased wages was to decrease turnover, he is incorrect in stating that it tied workers with the company for almost their entire lifetimes. People changed jobs, particularly if they could get a better job elsewhere. Also, his statement that a job with Ford lacked insecurity, as it often was a job for life points to his ignorance – Ford, struggling with serious financial problems in the mid-1920s had to close down his factory for modernization in 1927, firing most of his employees. Bauman further romanticizes this period. Although he sees some flaws of heavy capitalism, he suggests that things under it were better. He notes that people had authorities, which allowed them to change society for the better. They just needed to negotiate with the authorities or protest against them to find a solution. No mention of slavery, child labor, rampant discrimination based on race, sex, religion, political allegiance, extreme exploitation, and a plethora of social issues that plagued that world.
He also makes several far-fetched statements. For instance he claims that the causes of contemporary precariousness are connected with the collapse of the feudal system – peasantry, freed from the land lost “the ‘natural’ link between land, human toil and wealth” and became the tools of capital (p. 142).
His criticisms of modern times are often one-sided and overgeneralized. Yes, some people divorce without trying to fix their marriage. But not all people. Many people work on their relationships. Others divorce their spouses to get out of abusive relationships – but Bauman ignores this. Divorce, he seems to imply, is just an illustration of how we consider durability to be a negative trait. This is similar to his view that racism is ‘outmoded and unpracticed’ in terms of nationalism (p. 175). His approach to other issues, such as the fact that people no longer work in one place throughout their whole lives, are also problematic. Yes, some people do live in perpetual uncertainty. However, there are people, for whom a change of a job can help in the improvement of their conditions, getting away from an exploitive boss, getting a better salary, or finding a place to work closer to home etc. Although a job change can be, and often is, associated with certain problems, it also can mean getting a job one feels more comfortable with, allow one to get away from poor conditions. Finally, Bauman’s treatment of freedom is problematic. As mentioned earlier, he sees individual freedom as a form of domination. It turns people’s attention from civic matters and true work (we no longer work, he claims – we now merely ‘tinker’ – p. 139).
Bauman does not want to convince you. He pines for an old world that never existed, multiplying metaphors. Furthermore, although he does not necessarily romanticize the past, in his presentation it seems that he believed that life was better before liquid modernism. Yet he conveniently ignores discrimination, strife, terrible living conditions, and many other factors that were present in ancient Greece, feudal Europe or early industrial modernism. He does not look at the problems he presents critically, and presents them as one-sided overgeneralizations. Although he is capable of recognizing several social issues, his interpretations are hollow, and easily disproven.
Liquid Modernity proved to be a frustrating and disappointing read, flawed in many ways. Bauman’s knowledge is based on newspaper articles, casual observations and interpretations found in books written by others. He is selective with his material, and manipulates historical facts to suit his view. He is also fond of using absolute quantifiers, or implying that certain issues are universal. Even when he recognizes that something is not universal, he spins it in a way that would prove his point, as in his observation of the two young men sitting at an airport when he admits that such situations are not common, but immediately adds that this is what people (not some people, not a given group of people, but ‘people’) aspire to, and, as such, it is what will happen.
Bauman’s idea is that liquid modernity, which characterizes the era of ‘light capitalism’ (easily moved from country to country, flexible labor, etc.) is the end of true freedom (this is another problem, as Bauman sees individual freedom as a tool of oppression), ensnares people in the endless search for novelty, and destroys past values. People no longer want to interact. They run around shopping malls, in which there is no interaction, no community, just atomized individuals, who are focused on themselves – it is hard not to read Bauman’s lament as putting ‘society’ and ‘individual’ as a binary opposition. Ha also blames this on the concept of identity – “what matters is who you are, rather than what you are doing” (p. 108). No longer is social change possible, he suggests. There is no authority (or, rather, there are too many authorities, which cancel each other out – an issue that one can agree on), so even if people wanted to change something, they have nothing to protest against. So they go shopping. Bauman doesn’t mention why, in that case, are right-wing politics on the rise, nor why so much political strife can be observed.
The assumption Bauman makes, such as that uncertainty is a principle of liquid modernity and not found in previous epochs. Although he is accurate in his statement that Henry Ford’s increased wages was to decrease turnover, he is incorrect in stating that it tied workers with the company for almost their entire lifetimes. People changed jobs, particularly if they could get a better job elsewhere. Also, his statement that a job with Ford lacked insecurity, as it often was a job for life points to his ignorance – Ford, struggling with serious financial problems in the mid-1920s had to close down his factory for modernization in 1927, firing most of his employees. Bauman further romanticizes this period. Although he sees some flaws of heavy capitalism, he suggests that things under it were better. He notes that people had authorities, which allowed them to change society for the better. They just needed to negotiate with the authorities or protest against them to find a solution. No mention of slavery, child labor, rampant discrimination based on race, sex, religion, political allegiance, extreme exploitation, and a plethora of social issues that plagued that world.
He also makes several far-fetched statements. For instance he claims that the causes of contemporary precariousness are connected with the collapse of the feudal system – peasantry, freed from the land lost “the ‘natural’ link between land, human toil and wealth” and became the tools of capital (p. 142).
His criticisms of modern times are often one-sided and overgeneralized. Yes, some people divorce without trying to fix their marriage. But not all people. Many people work on their relationships. Others divorce their spouses to get out of abusive relationships – but Bauman ignores this. Divorce, he seems to imply, is just an illustration of how we consider durability to be a negative trait. This is similar to his view that racism is ‘outmoded and unpracticed’ in terms of nationalism (p. 175). His approach to other issues, such as the fact that people no longer work in one place throughout their whole lives, are also problematic. Yes, some people do live in perpetual uncertainty. However, there are people, for whom a change of a job can help in the improvement of their conditions, getting away from an exploitive boss, getting a better salary, or finding a place to work closer to home etc. Although a job change can be, and often is, associated with certain problems, it also can mean getting a job one feels more comfortable with, allow one to get away from poor conditions. Finally, Bauman’s treatment of freedom is problematic. As mentioned earlier, he sees individual freedom as a form of domination. It turns people’s attention from civic matters and true work (we no longer work, he claims – we now merely ‘tinker’ – p. 139).
Bauman does not want to convince you. He pines for an old world that never existed, multiplying metaphors. Furthermore, although he does not necessarily romanticize the past, in his presentation it seems that he believed that life was better before liquid modernism. Yet he conveniently ignores discrimination, strife, terrible living conditions, and many other factors that were present in ancient Greece, feudal Europe or early industrial modernism. He does not look at the problems he presents critically, and presents them as one-sided overgeneralizations. Although he is capable of recognizing several social issues, his interpretations are hollow, and easily disproven.
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October 6, 2017
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Bloodorange
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Oct 20, 2017 06:49AM
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Basically, a lot of factual errors, one-sided analyses, curmudgeonly pining for a past that never existed, and so on. His main claim is that people no longer work (now we only tinker), and have no authority, so we feel lost. He straightforwardly claims that in early modernism it was better, because you a) worked in on place for your entire life (though he believes that this was not optimal, the optimal situation was obviously in feudal Europe; he writes that the end of a feudal society destroyed peasantry along with “the natural link between land, human toil and wealth”, and turned these people into precarious tools for capital).
This sounds dangerous and depressing, indeed. The arguments you raised in the second para are worrying.
When analyzing a text, to fully have a rational comprehension about its content we must -among other thigs- be able to separate the concepts of posture and thought. If one is completely and utterly incapable of discerning these two things, one might be totally unaware if a hyperbole has reached that status discursively or descriptively. Comprehensions nearly always involves the possibility to salvage content inside a text and process it as it is understood, criticism can and usually is rationally constructive, but discursively destructive. To fall in the latter error also means to be absolutely incapable of salvaging content from a text, invading the comprehension process in the form of a discursive contraposture from which we artificially construct the comprehension of the text. It turns out, that one must be optimistic and wedge inside the hyperbole to see what has been hyperbolized even if the author doesn´t -which Bauman clearly does-.
Most of the universal conditionality you say this text contains is but a discursive device, and even if the author actively endorses these hyperboles, the essence of his thought would remain unaltered. One of the basic conditions of this concept is that it exists alongside an undissolved component of "solid modernity" as the author calls it, you also say that he defends a past that never existed, a past which he has not created, and a form which he CLEARLY criticizes. First off, you criticize being one sided, when your critique that he has created solid modernity can only be defended by only one of the ways in which -supposedly- he thinks it, which is also a confusion between an abstract model which can be induced and the absolutization of the cases which exemplify it, Fordian factories don´t have to be permanent for his model to be inducible to other cases -which the proliferation of the Taylorian and Fordian industrial models utterly demonstrate- neither does his distinction of solid/liquid have to be absolute being a conceptual apparatus to positionate modernity forms, he constantly uses the verb "tends" -at least in my Spanish version- to characterize these forms of modernity -specially the one you claim him to have created-. His distinction is exemplified in various and independent ways, the analysis of how the fears shown in Orwell´s 1984 no longer apply to our epoch has even more text than the former one, yet you don´t even mention it.
But what is more severe, when he pleads for the political sphere to be reconstructed, he never advocates to the reconstruction of solid modernity, his argumentation clearly eliminates that possibility and he makes it very clear. He states at the end of page 38: "The class, even being something constructed and negotiable over something inherited or something in which one was born, as estates, tended to hold its members with the force of premodern states [...] escaping them was not much easier that defying one´s place in the divine chain of being" (translated). The charge of his overall argumentation relies on the exposition of how the extreme individualization has unkbenowstly limited the freedom it originally pursued; "the way in which we live turns into a biographic solution to systematic problems" (page 39) "The gap between individuality as something predetermined -to have to be an individual- and individuality as the realistic and practical way to autoaffirmate oneself augments. [...] The autoaffirmative capabilities of men and women individualized in general cannot met the requirements of a genuine autoconstitution" (page 40) These two quotes cannot hold the weight of a total regression to class-like structures, they value the individual and his independence, thus being in direct theoretical and discursive contradiction with the endorsement of first quote and the totalization of his proposition to "reconstruct" the political sphere.
Even with this, most of the text can be traced to sociological works, thus its content is mostly descriptive or evaluative rather than prescriptive. There really is little to no room for you to have created this character of a text in which the author has a clear position and is terribly romantic. Even if the reader is still sceptic of what I say, the mere mention of the two former quotes –really just that-, being clear pillars of his though and overall descriptive, is enough to make your statement of a romanticized and biased text tremble.
You see, the body of your critique comes completely from the confusion of descriptive and discursive hyperbolism, you have made a posture with the contents of this book, turning it into a Strawman, and a terrible one, I must say. This is by far the worst form of critique, the one that completely bastardizes rational thinking, personalizing it to the point of complete obliteration. That is the different between posture and though, furthermost, that is the difference between comprehending content and creating a political personality with an exaggerated attitude to ease the process which is both a critique and a form of individualization from the text –again with the confusion-. I have to say it, but this is nothing more than cheap “edginess”.
Most of the universal conditionality you say this text contains is but a discursive device, and even if the author actively endorses these hyperboles, the essence of his thought would remain unaltered. One of the basic conditions of this concept is that it exists alongside an undissolved component of "solid modernity" as the author calls it, you also say that he defends a past that never existed, a past which he has not created, and a form which he CLEARLY criticizes. First off, you criticize being one sided, when your critique that he has created solid modernity can only be defended by only one of the ways in which -supposedly- he thinks it, which is also a confusion between an abstract model which can be induced and the absolutization of the cases which exemplify it, Fordian factories don´t have to be permanent for his model to be inducible to other cases -which the proliferation of the Taylorian and Fordian industrial models utterly demonstrate- neither does his distinction of solid/liquid have to be absolute being a conceptual apparatus to positionate modernity forms, he constantly uses the verb "tends" -at least in my Spanish version- to characterize these forms of modernity -specially the one you claim him to have created-. His distinction is exemplified in various and independent ways, the analysis of how the fears shown in Orwell´s 1984 no longer apply to our epoch has even more text than the former one, yet you don´t even mention it.
But what is more severe, when he pleads for the political sphere to be reconstructed, he never advocates to the reconstruction of solid modernity, his argumentation clearly eliminates that possibility and he makes it very clear. He states at the end of page 38: "The class, even being something constructed and negotiable over something inherited or something in which one was born, as estates, tended to hold its members with the force of premodern states [...] escaping them was not much easier that defying one´s place in the divine chain of being" (translated). The charge of his overall argumentation relies on the exposition of how the extreme individualization has unkbenowstly limited the freedom it originally pursued; "the way in which we live turns into a biographic solution to systematic problems" (page 39) "The gap between individuality as something predetermined -to have to be an individual- and individuality as the realistic and practical way to autoaffirmate oneself augments. [...] The autoaffirmative capabilities of men and women individualized in general cannot met the requirements of a genuine autoconstitution" (page 40) These two quotes cannot hold the weight of a total regression to class-like structures, they value the individual and his independence, thus being in direct theoretical and discursive contradiction with the endorsement of first quote and the totalization of his proposition to "reconstruct" the political sphere.
Even with this, most of the text can be traced to sociological works, thus its content is mostly descriptive or evaluative rather than prescriptive. There really is little to no room for you to have created this character of a text in which the author has a clear position and is terribly romantic. Even if the reader is still sceptic of what I say, the mere mention of the two former quotes –really just that-, being clear pillars of his though and overall descriptive, is enough to make your statement of a romanticized and biased text tremble.
You see, the body of your critique comes completely from the confusion of descriptive and discursive hyperbolism, you have made a posture with the contents of this book, turning it into a Strawman, and a terrible one, I must say. This is by far the worst form of critique, the one that completely bastardizes rational thinking, personalizing it to the point of complete obliteration. That is the different between posture and though, furthermost, that is the difference between comprehending content and creating a political personality with an exaggerated attitude to ease the process which is both a critique and a form of individualization from the text –again with the confusion-. I have to say it, but this is nothing more than cheap “edginess”.
Dear Manuel,
Thank you for the time you put into this detailed reply. I have been looking for somebody to discuss the text with, unfortunately with little success. Particularly thank you for pointing my attention to the fragment about individualism, which I do think is crucial. One of the defining characteristics of our times is a shifting of a virtual agency to the individual, failing to recognize systemic problems - illustrated for example by companies producing tons of plastics, who defend this environmentally detrimental practice by claiming that individuals don't have to buy their products, turning attention away from the systemic factors that come into play.
However, I wanted to defend my stance on the text in two aspects: subjectivity (bias), and its hyperbolic quality. As to the former, I do not think it is possible to be unbiased. We all exist in some form of ideology, regardless if we take this statement from Althusser, Marx, or Spinoza. Bauman's text is biased, as my review of it is. And I don't think that this is a negative, as the social realities, along with values and other related concepts we create are not universal. This does not mean that they are to be rejected or ignored; quite to the contrary. I do agree that my reaction to some of his thoughts may have been one-sided. but there are reasons for this, which I will discuss in a moment. Finally, this is a review, so something that often will be subjective.
As to the hyperbole, I would argue that the text follows a certain cliched method of writing that is dipped in metaphor and exaggeration, and which poses the risk of such a misinterpretation as you believe I committed. This style has long been defended by scholars as Judith Butler, whose argument holds water, apart from one aspect: her drawing on Adorno, who claimed that language should be complicated as to force the reader to reflect on the role it plays in society. However, as Rita Felski claims in her Limits of Critique (along with a number of other more recent authors), this is preaching to the converted, which alienates potential new readers, and limits the dissemination of these points of view. This is something that, in my opinion, is a burden on Bauman's writing: even right now we're engaged in trying to get to a core message that is obfuscated by his affectual posture.
However, I agree with you that my view is, in all likelihood, one-sided, like the omission of the fact that Bauman frequently uses the word "tends" to emphasize that these are tendencies, not universal facts. Your comment has led me to revisit the fragment about the the two men that I mentioned in my review that Bauman encountered in an Airport (as well as other parts of the book). I think that this illustrates the problem I have with this Liquid Modernity, and I mean problem as both "doubts about Bauman's book" as well as "problems with understanding its message": the book is clearly qualitative, and I approached his views as universalizing. That said, I do think that the hyperbolic nature of his text is a significant factor in this, as it distracts from the subtleties and complexities of the issues discussed. Unfortunately, I think that once you take away the hyperbolic elements of Bauman's prose leaves readers (or at least this reader in particular) with the feeling that its just a fairly run-of-the-mill critique and reductive of liquid modernity that can be found in other authors, which lacks the attempts at an in-depth analysis that I find in such scholars as Bruno Latour or Daniel Miller, who even goes as far as to call Bauman's writing as hysterical (see Miller, Shopping, Place and Identity, 1998, p. 8).
In my own experience, I actually liked the first hundred or so pages of the book. However, the many examples that he gives later on don't necessarily contradict his statements, but skew them in a way that renders them prone to misinterpretation.
Thank you for the time you put into this detailed reply. I have been looking for somebody to discuss the text with, unfortunately with little success. Particularly thank you for pointing my attention to the fragment about individualism, which I do think is crucial. One of the defining characteristics of our times is a shifting of a virtual agency to the individual, failing to recognize systemic problems - illustrated for example by companies producing tons of plastics, who defend this environmentally detrimental practice by claiming that individuals don't have to buy their products, turning attention away from the systemic factors that come into play.
However, I wanted to defend my stance on the text in two aspects: subjectivity (bias), and its hyperbolic quality. As to the former, I do not think it is possible to be unbiased. We all exist in some form of ideology, regardless if we take this statement from Althusser, Marx, or Spinoza. Bauman's text is biased, as my review of it is. And I don't think that this is a negative, as the social realities, along with values and other related concepts we create are not universal. This does not mean that they are to be rejected or ignored; quite to the contrary. I do agree that my reaction to some of his thoughts may have been one-sided. but there are reasons for this, which I will discuss in a moment. Finally, this is a review, so something that often will be subjective.
As to the hyperbole, I would argue that the text follows a certain cliched method of writing that is dipped in metaphor and exaggeration, and which poses the risk of such a misinterpretation as you believe I committed. This style has long been defended by scholars as Judith Butler, whose argument holds water, apart from one aspect: her drawing on Adorno, who claimed that language should be complicated as to force the reader to reflect on the role it plays in society. However, as Rita Felski claims in her Limits of Critique (along with a number of other more recent authors), this is preaching to the converted, which alienates potential new readers, and limits the dissemination of these points of view. This is something that, in my opinion, is a burden on Bauman's writing: even right now we're engaged in trying to get to a core message that is obfuscated by his affectual posture.
However, I agree with you that my view is, in all likelihood, one-sided, like the omission of the fact that Bauman frequently uses the word "tends" to emphasize that these are tendencies, not universal facts. Your comment has led me to revisit the fragment about the the two men that I mentioned in my review that Bauman encountered in an Airport (as well as other parts of the book). I think that this illustrates the problem I have with this Liquid Modernity, and I mean problem as both "doubts about Bauman's book" as well as "problems with understanding its message": the book is clearly qualitative, and I approached his views as universalizing. That said, I do think that the hyperbolic nature of his text is a significant factor in this, as it distracts from the subtleties and complexities of the issues discussed. Unfortunately, I think that once you take away the hyperbolic elements of Bauman's prose leaves readers (or at least this reader in particular) with the feeling that its just a fairly run-of-the-mill critique and reductive of liquid modernity that can be found in other authors, which lacks the attempts at an in-depth analysis that I find in such scholars as Bruno Latour or Daniel Miller, who even goes as far as to call Bauman's writing as hysterical (see Miller, Shopping, Place and Identity, 1998, p. 8).
In my own experience, I actually liked the first hundred or so pages of the book. However, the many examples that he gives later on don't necessarily contradict his statements, but skew them in a way that renders them prone to misinterpretation.
I was not pleading for you to have an unbiased view, rather to have a reasoned bias, that is, the thought with both a rational and discursive nature in which the latter emerges from the first one, but is, nevertheless, an emergence, irreducible to the latter. The core of the confusion lies in this; if personhood and context are to be interlaced, to plead for the two to be categorematically independent is understood as petition for these two to be completely separated in every sense of their meaning.
I was, rather, trying to point how your critique had been discursively constructed. How your rejection of the text was completely centralized around the rejection of a personality attributed to the text. My inquiry works in both senses of personality; the confusion can regard both one´s personal circumstance to create a bias, and the construction of an entitative affection sphere around the text and the author in question.
Whilst one might find difficult to operate outside his relativity, is not impossible nor “particular” in the scatological sense of the word by any means, the mere inclusion and comprehension of relativity has to carry out a purely inferential exercise that validates it in a material sense (Stawson, Analysis and Metaphysics). Gasset states in his text Ideas and Beliefs that if beliefs, a viewpoint, are to constitute the person in itself, then they have some type of special presence inside the self, being previous and omnipresent to how one is, well differentiated with what one does (entity/being). If thought is an act, it is well differentiable from one´s particularity, even being still rooted in it, and cannot be reduced to it.
Tracing the meaning of “hyperbole” to its function in verse, the real content and the form in which is being presented can and must be separated to comprehend the poem. In prose, there is no real reason to think that its inner mechanism has changed. I find curious that you say his prose is rather complicated and obscure, being one of the easiest styles regarding social theory. It nevertheless has, like you say, an “affectual prose”, he constantly uses vivid images to illustrate the body of the text, something that can surely be a burden.
Lastly, but most importantly, I don´t know Bruno Latour, but I know a bit of Actor-network theory. To say that Bauman is unoriginal is both right and false, respectively. As a completely creative social theory, liquid modernity is very lackluster, the book makes it very clear too, being mostly a synthesis of author like Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Richard Senett or Habermas (among others), nevertheless, and leaving these authors behind, the text has a particular –original- to further expand this social theory as a form of a particular and new critical theory that focuses more in the regeneration of agoral spaces –intermediaries between the political and the individual-, rather than the political vs the individual. Actor-network regards the epistemological, nor the political dimension of this pantheon of similar social theories. Even with this it is true that it doesn´t have as detail as it should have, nevertheless it has some very persuasive contents, and –I think- even with that it still retains value.
I was, rather, trying to point how your critique had been discursively constructed. How your rejection of the text was completely centralized around the rejection of a personality attributed to the text. My inquiry works in both senses of personality; the confusion can regard both one´s personal circumstance to create a bias, and the construction of an entitative affection sphere around the text and the author in question.
Whilst one might find difficult to operate outside his relativity, is not impossible nor “particular” in the scatological sense of the word by any means, the mere inclusion and comprehension of relativity has to carry out a purely inferential exercise that validates it in a material sense (Stawson, Analysis and Metaphysics). Gasset states in his text Ideas and Beliefs that if beliefs, a viewpoint, are to constitute the person in itself, then they have some type of special presence inside the self, being previous and omnipresent to how one is, well differentiated with what one does (entity/being). If thought is an act, it is well differentiable from one´s particularity, even being still rooted in it, and cannot be reduced to it.
Tracing the meaning of “hyperbole” to its function in verse, the real content and the form in which is being presented can and must be separated to comprehend the poem. In prose, there is no real reason to think that its inner mechanism has changed. I find curious that you say his prose is rather complicated and obscure, being one of the easiest styles regarding social theory. It nevertheless has, like you say, an “affectual prose”, he constantly uses vivid images to illustrate the body of the text, something that can surely be a burden.
Lastly, but most importantly, I don´t know Bruno Latour, but I know a bit of Actor-network theory. To say that Bauman is unoriginal is both right and false, respectively. As a completely creative social theory, liquid modernity is very lackluster, the book makes it very clear too, being mostly a synthesis of author like Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Richard Senett or Habermas (among others), nevertheless, and leaving these authors behind, the text has a particular –original- to further expand this social theory as a form of a particular and new critical theory that focuses more in the regeneration of agoral spaces –intermediaries between the political and the individual-, rather than the political vs the individual. Actor-network regards the epistemological, nor the political dimension of this pantheon of similar social theories. Even with this it is true that it doesn´t have as detail as it should have, nevertheless it has some very persuasive contents, and –I think- even with that it still retains value.