Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies. (English) Zbl 1203.91101
Summary: We show that synergies enhance bidding competition to such an extent that they are a curse rather than a blessing for the bidders.
MSC:
| 91B26 | Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models |
References:
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