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Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers. (English) Zbl 1254.91240

Summary: In this paper we consider sequential auctions with synergies where one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. We show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by F. Branco [Econ. Lett. 54, No. 2, 159–163 (1997; Zbl 0902.90035)]. Indeed we show that expected prices can actually increase.

MSC:

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Citations:

Zbl 0902.90035
Full Text: DOI

References:

[1] Binmore, K.; Klemperer, P., The biggest auction ever: the sale of British 3G telecom licenses, Economic Journal, 112, 478, C74-C96 (2002)
[2] Branco, F., Sequential auctions with synergies: an example, Economics Letters, 54, 159-163 (1997) · Zbl 0902.90035
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