Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures. (English) Zbl 1390.91025
The paper consists of six sections. In the introductory Section 1 the authors present the subject and findings of the paper, and a detailed overview of the related literature. Section 2 concerns generalizations of several characterizations of the core on classes of classical TU games to the wider classes of TU games with communication structures. Section 3 concerns the NTU case and generalizations of several characterizations of the core on NTU games with communication structures. In Section 4 the logical independence of the axioms is proven. In Section 5 the authors show that all their results presented in the paper may be extended to TU and NTU games with conference structures. Section 6 presents several concluding remarks, in particular, the fact that the intersection of the prekernel and the core on balanced TU games with communication structures is characterized similarly to the classical case.
Reviewer: Agnieszka Rusinowska (Paris)
MSC:
| 91A12 | Cooperative games |
References:
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