Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining. (English) Zbl 1429.91175
Summary: This paper studies infinite-horizon sequential bargaining among \(n\geq 3\) players in which a proposer is randomly selected from the pool of potential proposers. If the proposal is rejected, the current and previous proposers are excluded from the pool of potential proposers, and the game moves on to the next round until every player has had the same number of opportunities to be the proposer. To analyze the model with a particular time dependency within each sequence of \(n\) rounds (a cycle), I characterize the stationary equilibrium of a stochastic game, which I call cycle-stationary subgame perfect (CSSP) equilibrium. The CSSP equilibrium is unique in payoffs and analogous to the subgame perfect equilibrium of some forms of finite-horizon bargaining. Even when every player is entirely patient, the proposer’s share in the CSSP equilibrium is smaller than that predicted by the stationary equilibrium of the Baron-Ferejohn legislative bargaining model.
MSC:
| 91B26 | Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models |
| 91A15 | Stochastic games, stochastic differential games |
| 91F10 | History, political science |
References:
| [1] | Ali, S. Nageeb, Recognition for sale, J. Econ. Theory, 155, 16-29 (2015) · Zbl 1309.91066 |
| [2] | Ali, S. Nageeb; Bernheim, B. Douglas; Fan, Xiaochen, Predictability and power in legislative bargaining, Rev. Econ. Stud., 86, 2, 500-525 (2019), 03 · Zbl 1439.91021 |
| [3] | Ansolabehere, Stephen; Snyder, James M.; Strauss, Aaron B.; Ting, Michael M., Voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments, Am. J. Polit. Sci., 49, 3, 550-563 (2005) |
| [4] | Austen-Smith, David; Banks, Jeffrey S., Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure Michigan Studies in Political Analysis (January 2005), University of Michigan Press, January |
| [5] | Banks, Jeffrey S.; Duggan, John, A bargaining model of collective choice, Am. Polit. Sci. Rev., 94, 1, 73-88 (2000) |
| [6] | Baron, David P.; Ferejohn, John A., Bargaining in legislatures, Am. Polit. Sci. Rev., 83, 4, 1181-1206 (1989) |
| [7] | Battaglini, Marco; Coate, Stephen, Inefficiency in legislative policymaking: a dynamic analysis, Am. Econ. Rev., 97, 1, 118-149 (2007) |
| [8] | Bernheim, B. Douglas; Rangel, Antonio; Rayo, Luis, The power of the last word in legislative policy making, Econometrica, 74, 5, 1161-1190 (2006) · Zbl 1138.91596 |
| [9] | Board, Simon; Zwiebel, Jeffrey, Endogenous Competitive Bargaining (2012), Working paper |
| [10] | Breitmoser, Yves, Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members, Soc. Choice Welf., 37, 1, 149-169 (2011) · Zbl 1235.91152 |
| [11] | Cardona, Daniel; Polanski, Arnold, Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol, Soc. Choice Welf., 41, 2, 217-240 (Jul 2013) · Zbl 1288.91100 |
| [12] | Diermeier, Daniel; Merlo, Antonio, Government turnover in parliamentary democracies, J. Econ. Theory, 94, 1, 46-79 (2000) · Zbl 0971.91053 |
| [13] | Diermeier, Daniel; Merlo, Antonio; Fong, Pohan, Legislative bargaining with reconsideration, Q. J. Econ., 126, 2, 947-985 (2011) · Zbl 1219.91121 |
| [14] | Diermeier, Daniel; Merlo, Antonio; Prato, Carlo; Vlaicu, Razvan, A bargaining model of endogenous procedures, Soc. Choice Welf., 47, 4, 985-1012 (Dec 2016), Dec · Zbl 1392.91095 |
| [15] | Eguia, Jon X.; Shepsle, Kenneth A., Legislative bargaining with endogenous rules, J. Polit., 77, 4, 1076-1088 (2015) |
| [16] | Eraslan, Hülya, Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model, J. Econ. Theory, 103, 1, 11-30 (2002) · Zbl 1051.91009 |
| [17] | Eraslan, Hülya; McLennan, Andrew, Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining, J. Econ. Theory, 148, 6, 2195-2222 (2013) · Zbl 1284.91031 |
| [18] | Eraslan, Hülya; McLennan, Andrew; Evdokimov, Kirill S., Legislative and multilateral bargaining, Annu. Rev. Econ., 11, 1 (2019), null |
| [19] | Evans, Robert, Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers, Games Econ. Behav., 19, 2, 211-220 (1997) · Zbl 0882.90139 |
| [20] | Jackson, Matthew O.; Moselle, Boaz, Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game, J. Econ. Theory, 103, 1, 49-87 (2002) · Zbl 1012.91004 |
| [21] | Jeon, Jee Seon, The Emergence and Persistence of Oligarchy: a Dynamic Model of Endogenous Political Power (2016), Working paper · Zbl 1490.91106 |
| [22] | Norman, Peter, Legislative bargaining and coalition formation, J. Econ. Theory, 102, 2, 322-353 (2002) · Zbl 1039.91005 |
| [23] | Snyder, James M.; Ting, Michael M.; Ansolabehere, Stephen, Legislative bargaining under weighted voting, Am. Econ. Rev., 95, 4, 981-1004 (September 2005), September |
| [24] | Volden, Craig; Wiseman, Alan E., Bargaining in legislatures over particularistic and collective goods, Am. Polit. Sci. Rev., 101, 1, 79-92 (2007) |
| [25] | Yildirim, Huseyin, Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition, J. Econ. Theory, 136, 1, 167-196 (2007), 9 · Zbl 1281.91097 |
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.
