A bargaining model of endogenous procedures. (English) Zbl 1392.91095
Summary: This paper endogenizes policymaking procedures in a multilateral bargaining framework. A procedure specifies players’ proposal power in bargaining over one-dimensional policies. In procedural bargaining players internalize the procedures’ effects on subsequent policy bargaining. In policy bargaining players’ utilities are continuous, strictly concave, and order-restricted. The paper provides equilibrium characterization, existence, and uniqueness results for this two-tier bargaining model. Although the procedural choice set is multidimensional, sequentially rational procedures feature “limited power sharing” and admit a total order. In equilibrium, endogenous procedures and policies are strategic complements.
MSC:
| 91B26 | Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models |
| 91F10 | History, political science |
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