Summary: Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) have become a key building block in many security products as they provide interesting efficiency/security trade-offs. Indeed, a PAKE allows to dispense with the heavy public key infrastructures and its efficiency and portability make it well suited for applications such as Internet of Things or e-passports. With the emerging quantum threat and the effervescent development of post-quantum public key algorithms in the last five years, one would wonder how to modify existing password authenticated key exchange protocols that currently rely on Diffie-Hellman problems in order to include newly introduced and soon-to-be-standardized post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms \((\mathsf{KEM})\). A generic solution is desirable for maintaining modularity and adaptability with the many post-quantum \(\mathsf{KEM}\) that have been introduced.
In this paper, we propose two new generic and natural constructions proven in the Universal Composability (UC) model to transform, in a black-box manner, a \(\mathsf{KEM}\) into a PAKE with very limited performance overhead: one or two extra symmetric encryptions. Behind the simplicity of the designs, establishing security proofs in the UC model is actually non-trivial and requires some additional properties on the underlying KEM like fuzziness and anonymity. Luckily, post-quantum \(\mathsf{KEM}\) protocols often enjoy these two extra properties. As a demonstration, we prove that it is possible to apply our transformations to Crystals-Kyber, a lattice-based post-quantum KEM that will soon be standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). In a nutshell, this work opens up the possibility to securely include post-quantum cryptography in PAKE-based real-world protocols.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1523.94004].