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Utset, Manuel A.

Time-inconsistent bargaining and cross-commitments. (English) Zbl 1542.91103

Games 14, No. 3, Paper No. 38, 21 p. (2023).

MSC:

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A80 Applications of game theory
91B08 Individual preferences

Keywords:

time preferences; present bias; bargaining; commitment; delay
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Full Text: DOI

References:

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