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Upper and lower values in zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information. (English) Zbl 1532.91013

Summary: A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player’s information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain conditions on the evolution of the common and private information, a dynamic programming characterization of the value of the game (if it exists) is presented. If the value of the zero-sum game does not exist, then the dynamic program provides bounds on the upper and lower values of the game.

MSC:

91A15 Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
91A10 Noncooperative games
90C39 Dynamic programming

References:

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