Moving towards a more accurate level of inspection against fare evasion in proof-of-payment transit systems. (English) Zbl 1514.90130
Summary: This paper proposes an accurate economic framework to determine the optimum inspection level – the number of ticket inspectors – in a long time window, in order to maximize the system-wide profit when fare evasion occurs. This is the first framework that introduces: i) a refined characterization of the passenger demand, ii) a profit function with new constraints, iii) an alternative estimation of the percentage of passengers who choose to evade, and iv) a new formulation accounting for inspectors who cannot fine every passenger caught evading. The implementation of this framework is illustrated by using six years of data gathered from an Italian public transport company. Based on 57,256 stop-level inspections and 21,827 on-board personal interviews, the optimum inspection rate maximizing the profit is in the range of 3.4%-4.0%. This outcome provides more accurate results, which are discussed and compared to previous research. Finally, the framework is flexible, and it may be applied to any urban context in which proof-of-payment systems are adopted.
MSC:
| 90B25 | Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research |
| 90B20 | Traffic problems in operations research |
| 91A10 | Noncooperative games |
Keywords:
fare evasion; proof-of-payment; level of inspection; profit maximization model; constrained function; empirical supportReferences:
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