IAC probability calculations in voting theory: progress report. (English) Zbl 1504.91089
Diss, Mostapha (ed.) et al., Evaluating voting systems with probability models. Essays by and in honor of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley. Cham: Springer. Stud. Choice Welf., 399-416 (2021).
Summary: Over the past two decades, IAC probability calculation techniques have made substantial progress, particularly through methodological studies that have linked these calculations to their appropriate mathematical framework. We report on this progress by a brief description of the methods of calculation used in this field and by reviewing some of the results that the application of these methods made it possible to obtain.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1477.91003].
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1477.91003].
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