Pricing strategy and coordination mechanism of dual-channel supply chain based on reference quality effect. (English) Zbl 1498.90039
Summary: The difference between the actual product quality experienced by consumers after shopping and the product reference quality expected before shopping usually has a significant effect on product demand and brand reputation. This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. This investigation is on the influence of consumers’ reference quality under centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making Bertrand game, and decentralized decision-making Stackelberg game. Furthermore, in view of the influence of reference quality, this paper constructs cost-sharing contracts and two-part tariff contracts to discuss the consistency of the dual-channel supply chain. The results show that consumers’ reference quality effect has a positive impact on the equilibrium price and profit of the dual-channel supply chain. Under normal circumstances, the dual-channel supply chain cannot achieve conformity. However, consistency can be achieved under the two-part tariff contract mechanism. Finally, numerical simulation is carried out for verification with numerical values.
MSC:
90B06 | Transportation, logistics and supply chain management |
91B41 | Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) |
91A65 | Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) |
91A80 | Applications of game theory |