Evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game with extortion strategy under win-stay-lose-move rule. (English) Zbl 1496.91017
Summary: Extortion strategy and mobility have both been studied separately, and their roles for the evolution of cooperation are well known. In this paper, we combine these two mechanisms and explore the effects of one mechanism on another, especially for how spatial exclusion influences the dynamics. The model incorporates migration into the prisoner’s dilemma game with extortion and allows agents to change their spatial position governed by win-stay-lose-move rule. By means of Monte Carlo simulations, we show that when the population density is intermediate (neither too high or too low), empty sites weaken the cooperation-extortion alliance and allow cooperators to form compact clusters through migration, which then enhance network reciprocity in the populations. In this way, cooperation can be maintained in the structured populations with mobility, we thus provide a deeper understanding for the evolution of cooperation.
MSC:
| 91A22 | Evolutionary games |
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