Investment and operational decisions for start-up companies: a game theory and Markov decision process approach. (English) Zbl 1480.91303
Summary: This paper analyses the contract between an entrepreneur and an investor, using a non-zero sum game in which the entrepreneur is interested in company survival and the investor in maximizing expected net present value. Theoretical results are given and the model’s usefulness is exemplified using simulations. We have observed that both the entrepreneur and the investor are better off under a contract which involves repayments and a share of the start-up company. We also have observed that the entrepreneur will choose riskier actions as the repayments become harder to meet up to a level where the company is no longer able to survive.
MSC:
| 91G50 | Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) |
| 91B41 | Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) |
| 91A80 | Applications of game theory |
| 90C40 | Markov and semi-Markov decision processes |
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