New evolutionary game model of the regional governance of haze pollution in China. (English) Zbl 1480.91069
Summary: This paper constructs an evolutionary game model of haze cooperative control between the heterogeneity governments, which is used to analyze the dynamic evolution path of game system as well as evolutionarily stable strategy under the three different conditions: no constraint, the introduction of compensation mechanisms and the introduction of punishment mechanism. The results show that, due to the heterogeneity of governments, the stable model of cooperation cannot be formed between heterogeneous governments spontaneously, so the superior government should impose administrative penalties on the uncooperative governments to promote the formation and stability of cooperation control model. The conclusion of this paper can provide reference for the Chinese government to formulate environmental policies.
MSC:
| 91A80 | Applications of game theory |
| 91A22 | Evolutionary games |
| 91B76 | Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) |
| 86A10 | Meteorology and atmospheric physics |
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