×

The effects of student composition on teachers’ effort and students’ performance: implications for tracking, school choice, and affirmative action. (English) Zbl 1478.91134

Summary: The effect of sorting students based on their academic performances depends not only on direct peer effects but also on indirect peer effects through teachers’ efforts. Standard assumptions in the literature are insufficient to determine the effect of sorting on the performances of students and so are silent on the effect of policies such as tracking, implementing school choice, and voucher programs. We show that the effect of such policies depends on the curvature of teachers’ marginal utility of effort. We characterize conditions under which sorting increases (decreases) the total effort of teachers and the average performance of students.

MSC:

91B68 Matching models
Full Text: DOI

References:

[1] Avery, Christopher; Pathak, Parag A., The distributional consequences of public school choice, (National Bureau of Economic Research (2015))
[2] Barrow, Lisa; Rouse, Cecilia E., School vouchers and student achievement: Recent evidence, remaining questions (2008), FRB of Chicago Working Paper No. 2008-08
[3] Besley, Timothy; Ghatak, Maitreesh, Sorting with motivated agents: implications for school competition and teacher incentives, J. Eur. Econ. Assoc., 4, 2-3, 404-414 (2006)
[4] Chade, Hector; Vera de Serio, Virginia N., Wealth effects and agency costs, Games Econ. Behav., 86, 1-11 (2014) · Zbl 1296.91106
[5] Chakrabarti, Rajashri, Do vouchers lead to sorting under random private school selection? Evidence from the Milwaukee voucher program, Econ. Educ. Rev., 34, 191-218 (2013)
[6] Duflo, Esther; Dupas, Pascaline; Kremer, Michael, Peer effects, teacher incentives, and the impact of tracking: evidence from a randomized evaluation in Kenya, Am. Econ. Rev., 101, 5, 1739-1774 (2011)
[7] Edlin, Aaron S.; Shannon, Chris, Strict monotonicity in comparative statics, J. Econ. Theory, 81, 1, 201-219 (1998) · Zbl 0914.90003
[8] Epple, Dennis; Romano, Richard E., Competition between private and public schools, vouchers, and peer-group effects, Am. Econ. Rev., 33-62 (1998)
[9] Epple, Dennis; Romano, Richard, Peer effects in education: a survey of the theory and evidence, (Handbook of Social Economics, vol. 1(11) (2011)), 1053-1163
[10] Epple, Dennis; Newlon, Elizabeth; Romano, Richard, Ability tracking, school competition, and the distribution of educational benefits, J. Public Econ., 83, 1, 1-48 (2002)
[11] Foster, Gigi, It’s not your peers, and it’s not your friends: some progress toward understanding the educational peer effect mechanism, J. Public Econ., 90, 8, 1455-1475 (2006)
[12] Fryer, Roland, Teacher incentives and student achievement: evidence from New York city public schools, J. Labor Econ., 31, 373-427 (2013)
[13] Hastings, Justine S.; Weinstein, Jeffrey M., Information, school choice, and academic achievement: evidence from two experiments, (National Bureau of Economic Research (2007))
[14] Hsieh, Chang-Tai; Urquiola, Miguel, The effects of generalized school choice on achievement and stratification: evidence from Chile’s voucher program, J. Public Econ., 90, 8, 1477-1503 (2006)
[15] Kamali Shahdadi, Behrang, Matching with moral hazard: assigning attorneys to poor defendants, Am. Econ. J. Microecon., 10, 3, 1-33 (2018)
[16] Koedel, Cory; Mihaly, Kata; Rockoff, Jonah E., Value-added modeling: a review, Econ. Educ. Rev. (2015)
[17] Lavy, Victor, Evaluating the effect of teachers’ group performance incentives on pupil achievement, J. Polit. Econ., 110, 6, 1286-1317 (2002)
[18] Levin, Henry M., Educational vouchers: effectiveness, choice, and costs, J. Policy Anal. Manage., 17, 3, 373-392 (1998)
[19] MacLeod, W. Bentley; Urquiola, Miguel S., Anti-lemons: school reputation, relative diversity, and educational quality (2012), IZA discussion paper
[20] Milgrom, Paul; Shannon, Chris, Monotone comparative statics, Econometrica, 157-180 (1994) · Zbl 0789.90010
[21] Sacerdote, Bruce, Peer effects with random assignment: results for Dartmouth roommates, (National Bureau of Economic Research (2000)) · Zbl 0996.91553
[22] Sacerdote, Bruce, Peer effects in education: how might they work, how big are they and how much do we know thus far?, (Handbook of the Economics of Education, vol. 3 (2011)), 249-277
[23] Thiele, Henrik; Wambach, Achim, Wealth effects in the principal agent model, J. Econ. Theory, 89, 2, 247-260 (1999) · Zbl 0937.91047
[24] Tincani, Michela, School Vouchers and the Joint Sorting of Students and Teachers (2014), HCEO Working Paper No. 2014-012
[25] Todd, Petra E.; Wolpin, Kenneth I., Estimating a Coordination Game in the Classroom (2012), RISE Working Paper 14-017
[26] Topkis, Donald M., Supermodularity and Complementarity (1998), Princeton University Press
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.