Simple hyperintensional belief revision. (English) Zbl 1474.03069
Summary: I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.
MSC:
| 03B42 | Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) |
| 03A05 | Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations |
Keywords:
framing effects; hyperintensionality; belief revision; non-monotonic reasoning; doxastic logic; epistemic logic; inconsistent belief managementReferences:
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