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Normative conspiracy theory. (English. Russian original) Zbl 1462.91003

Autom. Remote Control 82, No. 4, 706-721 (2021); translation from Mat. Teor. Igr Prilozh. 12, No. 1, 33-59 (2020).
Summary: The author introduces a new model based on a correlated extension of normal-form games to describe the players’ behavior in environments that allow information asymmetry arising from different capabilities of private coordination of strategies.

MSC:

91A18 Games in extensive form
91A06 \(n\)-person games, \(n>2\)
Full Text: DOI

References:

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