Voting in combinatorial domains. (English) Zbl 1452.91129
Brandt, Felix (ed.) et al., Handbook of computational social choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 197-222 (2016).
Summary: This chapter addresses preference aggregation and voting on domains which are the Cartesian product (or sometimes, a subset of the Cartesian product) of finite domain values, each
corresponding to an issue, a variable, or an attribute.
As seen in other chapters of this handbook, voting rules map a profile (usually, a collection of rankings) into an alternative or a set of alternatives.
A key question has to do with the structure of the set of alternatives. Sometimes, this set
has a simple structure and a small cardinality (e.g., in a presidential election). But in many
contexts, it has a complex combinatorial structure.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1436.91001].
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1436.91001].
MSC:
91B12 | Voting theory |