Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments. (English) Zbl 1443.91132
Trockel, Walter (ed.), Social design. In memory of Leonid Hurwicz. Cham: Springer. Stud. Econ. Des., 99-137 (2019).
Summary: The aim of the present paper is to analyze the problem of assuring the feasibility of a mechanism (game form), implementing in Nash equilibrium a given social choice rule abbreviated as (SCR) when the mechanism is constrained as to the way in which it is permitted to depend on endowments. A social choice rule is a correspondence specifying outcomes considered to be desirable in a given economy (environment). A mechanism is defined by (a) an outcome function and (b) a strategy domain prescribed for each player. Our outcome functions are not permitted to depend at all on the initial endowments. As to strategy domains, the \(i\)th agent’s strategy domain \(S^i\) is only permitted to depend on that agent’s endowment, but not on the endowments, other agents. (For earlier results concerning endowment manipulation, see [the last author, Rev. Econ. Stud. 46, 255–262 (1979; Zbl 0409.90014); M. R. Sertel, Econ. Lett. 46, No. 2, 167–171 (1994; Zbl 0815.90013)]).
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1427.91005].
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1427.91005].
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