Sequential auctions and externalities. (English) Zbl 1425.91203
Rabani, Yuval (ed.), Proceedings of the 23rd annual ACM-SIAM symposium on discrete algorithms, SODA 2012, Kyoto, Japan, January 17–19, 2012. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM); New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 869-886 (2012).
MSC:
| 91B26 | Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models |
References:
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