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Imperfect information transmission and adverse selection in asset markets. (English) Zbl 1419.91321

Summary: This paper studies asset markets where owners of assets do not inherit private information from previous owners after a transaction and must learn about asset quality over time. Instantaneous learning by owners maximizes the number of owners with private information, but also maximizes the trading volume and welfare. This result is contrary to the traditional view that information asymmetry hurts trade efficiency. Public disclosure of information is not always optimal and its welfare implication depends crucially on the source of gains from trade.

MSC:

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B44 Economics of information
Full Text: DOI

References:

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