Prescriptive norms and social comparisons. (English) Zbl 1419.91295
Summary: This paper analyzes the equilibrium strength of prescriptive norms to contribute to public goods. We consider three methods of establishing what an acceptable contribution to the public good is. Under the first method, the contribution of the bottom contributor is the reference point by which the comparison is being made; under the second, the median contribution is the reference point; and under the third the top contribution is the reference. The first method results in a unique equilibrium and the reference contribution is endogenously low. Each of the latter two methods allows for multiple equilibria differing in contributions made and thus in the strength of the norm to contribute. Comparing the methods we show that the median reference allows for the highest equilibrium contributions and welfare of all methods hence is the preferred method if, among the multiple equilibria, the best one can be selected. However, the bottom-reference is the maximin method, i.e., it provides safe minimal aggregate contribution and welfare that surpass the worst outcome in the other two methods.
References:
| [1] | Cialdini, R.B.; Kallgren, C.A.; Reno, R.R.; A focus theory of normative conduct: A theoretical refinement and reevaluation of the role of norms in human behavior; Advances in Experimental Social Psychology: Cambridge, MA, USA 1991; Volume Volume 24 ,201-234. |
| [2] | Schelling, T.C.; ; The Strategy of Conflict: Cambridge, MA, USA 1960; . · Zbl 1110.91001 |
| [3] | Lewis, D.K.; ; Convention: A Philosophical Study: Cambridge, MA, USA 1969; . |
| [4] | Granovetter, M.; Threshold Models of Collective Behavior; Am. J. Sociol.: 1978; Volume 83 ,1420-1443. |
| [5] | Young, H.P.; The Evolution of Conventions; Econometrica: 1993; Volume 61 ,57-84. · Zbl 0773.90101 |
| [6] | Michaeli, M.; Spiro, D.; From Peer Pressure to Biased Norms; Am. Econ. J. Microecon.: 2017; Volume 9 ,152-216. |
| [7] | Carvalho, J.P.; Coordination and culture; Econ. Theory: 2017; Volume 64 ,449-475. · Zbl 1398.91243 |
| [8] | Krupka, E.L.; Weber, R.A.; Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary?; J. Eur. Econ. Assoc.: 2013; Volume 11 ,495-524. |
| [9] | Cialdini, R.B.; Crafting normative messages to protect the environment; Curr. Directi. Psychol. Sci.: 2003; Volume 12 ,105-109. |
| [10] | Blumenthal, M.; Christian, C.; Slemrod, J.; Smith, M.G.; Do normative appeals affect tax compliance? Evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota; Natl. Tax J.: 2001; Volume 54 ,125-138. |
| [11] | Booij, A.S.; Leuven, E.; Oosterbeek, H.; Ability peer effects in university: Evidence from a randomized experiment; Rev. Econ. Stud.: 2017; Volume 84 ,547-578. · Zbl 1405.91506 |
| [12] | Young, H.P.; Social norms and economic welfare1; Eur. Econ. Rev.: 1998; Volume 42 ,821-830. |
| [13] | Jackson, M.O.; Zenou, Y.; Games on networks; Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications: Amsterdam, The Netherlands 2015; Volume Volume 4 ,95-163. |
| [14] | Nyborg, K.; Social Norms and the Environment; Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ.: 2018; Volume 10 ,405-423. |
| [15] | Bénabou, R.; Tirole, J.; Incentives and Prosocial Behavior; Am. Econ. Rev.: 2006; Volume 96 ,1652-1678. |
| [16] | Bénabou, R.; Tirole, J.; ; Laws and Norms: Bonn, Germany 2012; . · Zbl 1065.91068 |
| [17] | Andreoni, J.; Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving; Econ. J.: 1990; Volume 100 ,464-477. |
| [18] | Harbaugh, W.T.; What do donations buy?: A model of philanthropy based on prestige and warm glow; J. Public Econ.: 1998; Volume 67 ,269-284. |
| [19] | Ledyard, J.O.; Is there a problem with public goods provision; The Handbook of Experimental Economics: Princeton, NJ, USA 1995; ,111-194. |
| [20] | Kandel, E.; Lazear, E.P.; Peer pressure and partnerships; J. Polit. Econ.: 1992; Volume 100 ,801-817. |
| [21] | Clark, A.E.; Oswald, A.J.; Comparison-concave utility and following behaviour in social and economic settings; J. Public Econ.: 1998; Volume 70 ,133-155. |
| [22] | Shang, J.; Croson, R.; A field experiment in charitable contribution: The impact of social information on the voluntary provision of public goods; Econ. J.: 2009; Volume 119 ,1422-1439. |
| [23] | Chen, Y.; Harper, F.M.; Konstan, J.; Li, S.X.; Social comparisons and contributions to online communities: A field experiment on movielens; Am. Econ. Rev.: 2010; Volume 100 ,1358-1398. |
| [24] | Rege, M.; Telle, K.; The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations; J. Public Econ.: 2004; Volume 88 ,1625-1644. |
| [25] | Allcott, H.; Social norms and energy conservation; J. Public Econ.: 2011; Volume 95 ,1082-1095. |
| [26] | Frey, B.S.; Meier, S.; Social comparisons and pro-social behavior: Testing “conditional cooperation” in a field experiment; Am. Econ. Rev.: 2004; Volume 94 ,1717-1722. |
| [27] | Festinger, L.; A theory of social comparison processes; Hum. Relat.: 1954; Volume 7 ,117-140. |
| [28] | Sugden, R.; Reciprocity: The supply of public goods through voluntary contributions; Econ. J.: 1984; Volume 94 ,772-787. |
| [29] | Brekke, K.A.; Kverndokk, S.; Nyborg, K.; An Economic Model of Moral Motivation; J. Public Econ.: 2003; Volume 87 ,1967-1983. |
| [30] | Fehr, E.; Gächter, S.; Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments; Am. Econ. Rev.: 2000; Volume 90 ,980-994. |
| [31] | Herrmann, B.; Thöni, C.; Gächter, S.; Antisocial punishment across societies; Science: 2008; Volume 319 ,1362-1367. |
| [32] | Kahneman, D.; Tversky, A.; Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk; Econometrica: 1979; Volume 47 ,263-292. · Zbl 0411.90012 |
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.
