Dynamic R&D with spillovers: a comment. (English) Zbl 1401.91045
Summary: R. Cellini and L. Lambertini [ibid. 33, No. 3, 568–582 (2009; Zbl 1170.91322)] study a dynamic R&D game with spillovers. This comment demonstrates that, contrary to what is claimed in their paper, the game is not state redundant and the open-loop Nash equilibrium is not subgame perfect.
MSC:
| 91B06 | Decision theory |
| 90B50 | Management decision making, including multiple objectives |
| 91A23 | Differential games (aspects of game theory) |
Citations:
Zbl 1170.91322References:
| [1] | Basar, T.; Olsder, G. J., Dynamic noncooperative game theory, (1999), SIAM New York · Zbl 0946.91001 |
| [2] | Cellini, R.; Lambertini, L., R&D incentives and market structure: dynamic analysis, J. Optim. Theory Appl., 126, 85-96, (2005) · Zbl 1084.91028 |
| [3] | Cellini, R.; Lambertini, L., Dynamic R&D with spilloverscompetition vs cooperation, J. Econ. Dyn. Control, 33, 568-582, (2009) · Zbl 1170.91322 |
| [4] | Cellini, R.; Lambertini, L., R&D incentives under bertrand competitiona differential game, Jpn. Econ. Rev., 62, 387-400, (2011) |
| [5] | d׳Aspremont, C.; Jacquemin, A., Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers, Am. Econ. Rev., 78, 1133-1137, (1988) |
| [6] | Fershtman, C., Identification of classes of differential games for which the open loop is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium, J. Optim. Theory Appl., 55, 217-231, (1987) · Zbl 0616.90108 |
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