Network connectivity under node failure. (English) Zbl 1398.91018
Summary: We examine a noncooperative model of network formation where players may stop functioning. We identify conditions under which Nash and efficient networks will remain connected after the loss of \(k\) nodes by introducing the notion of \(k\)-node super connectivity.
References:
| [1] | Bala, V.; Goyal, S., A strategic analysis of network reliability, Rev. Econ. Des., 5, 205-228, (2000) |
| [2] | Billand, P.; Bravard, C.; Sarangi, S., Heterogeneity and link imperfections in Nash networks, Int. Game Theory Rev., 13, 181-194, (2011) · Zbl 1236.91014 |
| [3] | De Jaegher, K. J.M.; Hoyer, B., Strategic network disruption and defense, J. Public Econ. Theory, (2016), (forthcoming) |
| [4] | Dziubiński, M.; Goyal, S., Network design and defense, Games Econom. Behav., 79, 30-43, (2013) · Zbl 1281.91044 |
| [5] | Goyal, S.; Vigier, A., Attack, defense, and contagion in networks, Rev. Econom. Stud., 81, 4, 1518-1542, (2014) · Zbl 1405.91074 |
| [6] | Haller, H., 2016. Network vulnerability: a Designer-Disruptor game, Working paper. Available at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/vpi/wpaper/e07-50.html. |
| [7] | Haller, H.; Sarangi, S., Nash networks with heterogeneous links, Math. Social Sci., 50, 181-201, (2005) · Zbl 1115.91041 |
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.
