Summary: In a two-stage supply chain coordination problem with loss-averse retailer and quality level, this paper analyzes the optimal strategies under the decentralized and integrated supply chain, respectively. A supply chain coordination contract model is constructed by combining the buyback contract and the quality cost sharing contract, and the validity of the model is proven. By the game analysis, several results are obtained: The increase in the loss-averse retailer’s order quantity will prompt the improvement of the supplier’s quality level to maintain the supplier’s competitive advantage, while the improvement of the supplier’s quality level will increase the loss-averse retailer’s order quantity; the buyback contract cannot coordinate the two-stage supply chain; the contract combined the buyback contract and quality cost sharing contract can coordinate the two-stage supply chain under certain conditions. Furthermore, under both the decentralized and integrated supply chain, the impacts of the changes of the parameters in the model on the optimal strategies of supplier and retailer and the profits of supply chain are presented through a sensitivity analysis of the parameters.