Constructions secure against receiver selective opening and chosen ciphertext attacks. (English) Zbl 1383.94024
Handschuh, Helena (ed.), Topics in cryptology – CT-RSA 2017. The cryptographers’ track at the RSA conference 2017, San Francisco, CA, USA, February 14–17, 2017. Proceedings. Cham: Springer (ISBN 978-3-319-52152-7/pbk; 978-3-319-52153-4/ebook). Lecture Notes in Computer Science 10159, 417-431 (2017).
Summary: In this paper we study public key encryption schemes of indistinguishability security against receiver selective opening (IND-RSO) attacks, where the attacker can corrupt some receivers and get the corresponding secret keys in the multi-party setting. Concretely: = 0.5 cm
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1356.94003].
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- We present a general construction of RSO security against chosen ciphertext attacks (RSO-CCA) by combining any RSO secure scheme against chosen plaintext attacks (RSO-CPA) with any regular CCA secure scheme, along with an appropriate non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.
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- We show that the leakage-resistant construction given by C. Hazay et al. [Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 7881, 160–176 (2013; Zbl 1306.94061)] in Eurocrypt 2013 from weak hash proof system (wHPS) is RSO-CPA secure.
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- We further show that the CCA secure construction given by R. Cramer and V. Shoup [Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 2332, 45–64 (2002; Zbl 1055.94011)] in Eurocrypt 2002 based on the universal HPS is RSO-CCA secure, hence obtain a more efficient paradigm for RSO-CCA security.
For the entire collection see [Zbl 1356.94003].
MSC:
| 94A60 | Cryptography |
References:
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