On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching. (English) Zbl 1371.91132
Summary: The paper provides a possible explanation for the occurrence of uniform, fixed-proportion rules for sharing surplus in two-sided markets. We study a two-sided matching model with transferable utility where agents are characterized by privately known, multi-dimensional attributes that jointly determine the surplus of each potential partnership. We ask the following question: for what divisions of surplus within matched pairs is it possible to implement the efficient (surplus-maximizing) matching? Our main result shows that the only robust rules compatible with efficient matching are those that divide realized surplus in a fixed proportion, independently of the attributes of the pair’s members: each agent must expect to get the same fixed percentage of surplus in every conceivable match. A more permissive result is obtained for one-dimensional attributes and supermodular surplus functions.
Keywords:
matching; surplus division; premuneration values; interdependent values; multi-dimensional attributesReferences:
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