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Centralized allocation in multiple markets. (English) Zbl 1368.91118

Summary: We provide a characterization result for the problem of centralized allocation of indivisible objects in multiple markets. Each market may be interpreted either as a different type of object or as a different period. We show that every allocation rule that is strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient and nonbossy is a sequential dictatorship. The result holds for an arbitrary number of agents and for any preference domain that contains the class of lexicographical preferences.

MSC:

91B32 Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

References:

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