Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions. (English) Zbl 1348.91118
Proceedings of the 3rd conference on innovations in theoretical computer science, ITCS’12, Cambridge, MA, USA, January 8–10, 2012. New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) (ISBN 978-1-4503-1115-1). 236-248 (2012).
MSC:
| 91B26 | Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models |
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