A normatively adequate credal reductivism. (English) Zbl 1318.03008
Summary: It is a prevalent, if not popular, thesis in the metaphysics of belief that facts about an agent’s beliefs depend entirely upon facts about that agent’s underlying credal state. Call this thesis ‘credal reductivism’ and any view that endorses this thesis a ‘credal reductivist view’. An adequate credal reductivist view will accurately predict both when belief occurs and which beliefs are held appropriately, on the basis of credal facts alone. Several well-known – and some lesser known – objections to credal reductivism turn on the inability of standard credal reductivist views to get the latter, normative, results right. This paper presents and defends a novel credal reductivist view according to which belief is a type of “imprecise credence” that escapes these objections by including an extreme credence of 1.
MSC:
| 03A05 | Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations |
| 03B42 | Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) |
Keywords:
belief; credal reductivism; imprecise credences; correctness; lottery paradox; preface paradoxReferences:
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