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Comparative statics for oligopoly: a generalized result. (English) Zbl 1295.91062

Summary: We perform comparative statics for a general model of asymmetric oligopoly and derive a concise formula for the response of one firm to a marginal change in its rival’s strategic variable, taking into account the responses of all other firms. We obtain the conditions under which the sign of this response coincides with that of the mixed second-order partial derivative of the firm’s payoff function. We then propose a distinction between gross and net strategic relationships (i.e., strategic substitute and complement).

MSC:

91B54 Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)
91B38 Production theory, theory of the firm

References:

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