Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments. (English) Zbl 1282.91073
Summary: Following E. Fehr and S. Gächter [“Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments”, Am. Econ. Rev. 90, No. 4, 980–994 (2000; doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980)], a large and growing number of experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment are allowed. Nearly all experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a complete network where all subjects can monitor and punish each other. The architecture of social networks becomes important when subjects can only monitor and punish the other subjects to whom they are connected by the network. We study several incomplete networks and find that they give rise to their own distinctive patterns of behavior. Nevertheless, a number of simple, yet fundamental, properties in graph theory allow us to interpret the variation in the patterns of behavior that arise in the laboratory and to explain the impact of network architecture on the efficiency and dynamics of the experimental outcomes.
References:
| [1] | Anderson C, Putterman L (2005) Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism. Games Econ Behav 54(1): 1–24 · Zbl 1129.91316 · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.007 |
| [2] | Carpenter J (2007) Punishing free-riders: how group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods. Games Econ Behav 60(1): 31–51 · Zbl 1155.91351 · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.011 |
| [3] | Carpenter J, Matthews P (2009) What norms trigger punishment?. Exp Econ 12(3): 272–288 · Zbl 1190.91037 · doi:10.1007/s10683-009-9214-z |
| [4] | Cinyabuguma M, Page T, Putterman L (2005) Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment. J Publ Econ 89(8): 1421–1435 · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011 |
| [5] | Fehr E, Gächter S (2000) Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Am Econ Rev 90(4): 980–994 · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 |
| [6] | Jackson M (2008) Social and economic networks. Princeton University Press, Princeton · Zbl 1149.91051 |
| [7] | Kosfeld M (2004) Economic networks in the laboratory: a survey. Rev Netw Econ 3(1): 20–41 |
| [8] | Ledyard J (1995) Public goods: a survey of experimental research. In: Kagel J, Roth A (eds) The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 111–194 |
| [9] | Masclet D, Noussair C, Tucker S, Villeval M-C (2003) Monetary and nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. Am Econ Rev 93(1): 366–380 · doi:10.1257/000282803321455359 |
| [10] | Nikiforakis N (2008) Punishment and counter-punishment in public goods games: can we still govern ourselves?. J Publ Econ 92(1–2): 91–112 · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008 |
| [11] | O’Gorman R, Henrich J, Van Vugt M (2009) Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation. Proc R Soc B 276: 323–329 · doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.1082 |
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.
