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McGlynn, Aidan

Believing things unknown. (English) Zbl 1278.03022

Nôus 47, No. 2, 385-407 (2013).

Cited in 4 Documents

MSC:

03A05 Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations
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References:

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