Technical note: “An irrational-behavior-proof condition in cooperative differential games”. (English) Zbl 1274.91075
Summary: Under dynamic cooperation a player may use ‘irrational’ acts to extort additional gains if later circumstances allow. In this article we present a condition under which even if irrational behaviors appear later in the game the concerned player would still be performing better under the cooperative scheme.
References:
| [1] | DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1889(00)00013-0 · Zbl 0978.91018 · doi:10.1016/S0165-1889(00)00013-0 |
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