On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game. (English) Zbl 1269.91008
Summary: This paper presents two characterizations of the core on the domain of all NTU games. One is based on consistency with respect to “complement-reduced game” and converse consistency with respect to “max-reduced game”. The other is based on consistency with respect to “max-reduced game” and weak converse consistency with respect to “complement-reduced game”. Besides, we introduce an alternative definition of individual rationality, that we name conditional individual rationality, which is compatible with non-emptiness. We discuss axiomatic characterizations involving conditional individual rationality for the core.
MSC:
| 91A12 | Cooperative games |
Keywords:
core; reduced game; consistency; converse consistency; conditional individual rationality; NTU gamesReferences:
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