Audited reputation. (English) Zbl 1255.91043
Summary: We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with S. Tadelis [“The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism”, J. Polit. Econ. 110, No. 4, 854–882 (2002)].
References:
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| [2] | Fudenberg, D.; Levine, D. K., Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed, Review of Economic Studies, 59, 3, 561-579 (1992) · Zbl 0763.90108 |
| [3] | Hidvegi, Z.; Whinston, A. B., (Mechanism design for grid computing, Working paper (2006)) |
| [4] | Mailath, G. J.; Samuelson, L., Who wants a good reputation?, Review of Economic Studies, 68, 2, 415-441 (2001) · Zbl 0980.91048 |
| [5] | Rittenberg, L. E.; Schwieger, B. J., (Auditing: Concepts for a changing environment, Chapter 9 (South-Western) (2005)), 334-368 |
| [6] | Tadelis, S., The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy, 110, 4, 854-882 (2002) |
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