×

On the supermodularity of homogeneous oligopoly games. (English) Zbl 1215.91007

Summary: The main purpose is to prove the supermodularity (convexity) property of a cooperative game arising from an economical situation. The underlying oligopoly situation is based on a linear inverse demand function as well as linear cost functions for the participating firms. The characteristic function of the so-called oligopoly game is determined by maximizing, for any cartel of firms, the net profit function over the feasible production levels of the firms in the cartel, taking into account their individual capacities of production and production technologies. The (rather effective) proof of the supermodularity of the characteristic function of the oligopoly game relies on the use of maximizers for the relevant maximization problems. A similar proof technique will be reviewed for a related cooperative oligopoly game arising from a slightly modified oligopoly situation where the production technology of the cartel is determined by the most efficient member firm.

MSC:

91A12 Cooperative games
91A40 Other game-theoretic models
91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Full Text: DOI

References:

[1] R. J. Aumann, Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, ed. M. Shubik (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1961) pp. 3–27.
[2] Bagwell K., American Economic Review 84 pp 498–
[3] M. Breton, K. Fredj and G. Zaccour, The Tenth International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications, International Society of Dynamic Games (ISDG) I, eds. L. A. Petrosjan and N. A. Zenkevich (St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia, 2002) pp. 129–138. · Zbl 1049.91009
[4] DOI: 10.1007/BF01780629 · Zbl 0318.90012 · doi:10.1007/BF01780629
[5] DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-7787-8 · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7787-8
[6] DOI: 10.1142/S0219198901000336 · Zbl 1003.91004 · doi:10.1142/S0219198901000336
[7] DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.01.003 · Zbl 1117.91007 · doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.01.003
[8] DOI: 10.1002/net.3230200207 · Zbl 0689.90080 · doi:10.1002/net.3230200207
[9] DOI: 10.1007/BF01245567 · Zbl 0776.90093 · doi:10.1007/BF01245567
[10] DOI: 10.1007/BF01753435 · Zbl 0251.90056 · doi:10.1007/BF01753435
[11] Meinhardt H., Journal of Public Economic Theory 2 pp 247–
[12] DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-56136-8 · Zbl 0985.91003 · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-56136-8
[13] DOI: 10.2307/2938316 · Zbl 0728.90098 · doi:10.2307/2938316
[14] Milgrom P., American Economic Review 80 pp 511–
[15] DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(81)90086-6 · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(81)90086-6
[16] DOI: 10.1017/CCOL0521360552 · doi:10.1017/CCOL0521360552
[17] DOI: 10.1007/BF01761077 · Zbl 0715.90102 · doi:10.1007/BF01761077
[18] DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00091-9 · Zbl 1035.91009 · doi:10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00091-9
[19] DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_22 · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_22
[20] DOI: 10.2307/3003484 · doi:10.2307/3003484
[21] DOI: 10.1007/BF01753431 · Zbl 0222.90054 · doi:10.1007/BF01753431
[22] Shapley L. S., American Economic Review 59 pp 678–
[23] DOI: 10.1007/BF01755727 · Zbl 0494.90096 · doi:10.1007/BF01755727
[24] DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(90)90006-G · Zbl 0753.90083 · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(90)90006-G
[25] DOI: 10.2140/pjm.1955.5.285 · Zbl 0064.26004 · doi:10.2140/pjm.1955.5.285
[26] DOI: 10.1287/opre.26.2.305 · Zbl 0379.90089 · doi:10.1287/opre.26.2.305
[27] DOI: 10.1137/0317054 · Zbl 0433.90091 · doi:10.1137/0317054
[28] DOI: 10.1016/S0377-2217(87)80179-0 · Zbl 0623.90095 · doi:10.1016/S0377-2217(87)80179-0
[29] DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1995.1078 · Zbl 0840.90015 · doi:10.1006/jeth.1995.1078
[30] Topkis D. M., Frontiers of Economic Research, in: Supermodularity and Complementarity (1998)
[31] DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(90)90005-T · Zbl 0708.90094 · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(90)90005-T
[32] Vives X., Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools (1999)
[33] von Neumann J., Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) · Zbl 0063.05930
[34] DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00019-5 · Zbl 0967.91005 · doi:10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00019-5
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.