×

Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space. (English) Zbl 1211.91138

Summary: We consider an \(n\)-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining solution as the length of a time period between offers goes to zero. Without the differentiability assumption, convergence need not hold.

MSC:

91B26 Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A10 Noncooperative games

References:

[1] Binmore K (1985) Bargaining and coalitions. In: Roth A (eds) Game theoretic models of bargaining. Cambridge University Press, New York
[2] Binmore K, Rubinstein A, Wolinsky A (1986) The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling. Rand J Econ 17: 176–188 · doi:10.2307/2555382
[3] Chae S, Yang J-A (1988) The unique perfect equilibrium of an N-person bargaining game. Econ Lett 28: 221–223 · Zbl 1328.91019 · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(88)90118-8
[4] Chae S, Yang J-A (1994) An N-person pure bargaining game. J Econ Theory 62: 86–102 · Zbl 0801.90129 · doi:10.1006/jeth.1994.1005
[5] Chatterjee K, Sabourian H (2000) Multiperson bargaining and strategic complexity. Econometrica 68: 1491–1509 · Zbl 1020.91006 · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00169
[6] Herings PJJ, Predtetchinski A (2007) One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities. METEOR Research Memorandum 07/044, University of Maastricht · Zbl 1202.91114
[7] Herrero M (1985) Strategic theory of market institutions, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, LSE
[8] Huang C-Y (2002) Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers. Econ Theory 20: 401–412 · Zbl 1035.91016 · doi:10.1007/s001990100192
[9] Krishna V, Serrano R (1996) Multilateral bargaining. Rev Econ Stud 63: 61–80 · Zbl 0844.90122 · doi:10.2307/2298115
[10] Kultti K, Vartiainen H (2007) Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, discounting, and Nash bargaining. J Econ Theory 137(1): 721–728 · Zbl 1132.91322 · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.11.006
[11] Lensberg T, Thomson W (1988) Characterizing the Nash solution without Parato-opitmality. Soc Choice Welfare 5: 547–559 · Zbl 0666.90096 · doi:10.1007/BF00735765
[12] Nash J (1950) The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18: 155–162 · Zbl 1202.91122 · doi:10.2307/1907266
[13] Rubinstein A (1982) Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50: 97–109 · Zbl 0474.90092 · doi:10.2307/1912531
[14] Suh S-C, Wen Q (2006) Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution. J Math Econ 42: 61–73 · Zbl 1142.91497 · doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.06.001
[15] Sutton J (1986) Non-cooperative bargaining theory: an introduction. Rev Econ Stud 53: 709–724 · Zbl 0641.90093 · doi:10.2307/2297715
[16] Thomson W, Lensberg T (1989) Axiomatic theory of bargaining with variable number of agents. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK · Zbl 0745.90089
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.